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Abstract
This essay situates causal explanation on how the use of strategic interactions in the mainstream 
politics of aid dependent states that have weak institutional structures, and mostly in transition from 
post-conflict to relative stability, challenge the management of development aid in those societies. 
Building on the case study of Sierra Leone, this study argues that, strategic interactions within the 
politics of the post-conflict governments resulted into a pattern of instrumentalized policy 
manipulation between political parties, policies that eventually metamorphosed into the government 
development tool but not fundamentally founded on national development framework. This strategic 
political interaction posed a systematic threat and challenged the management of development aid in 
Sierra Leone, where in the post-conflict period, the country experienced massive aid but development 
remained stagnated.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyze how the pattern of strategic interactions between two post-
conflict political party policy frameworks in Sierra Leone that were metamorphosed into the formation 
of postwar governments from 2002 to 2018, on which development assistance was concentrated 
conceived could enhance national development and the consolidation of liberal peacebuilding for the
enhancement of social change in the country, became the principal challenge of the management of 
development aid in the country.
Several decades since its emergence, development assistance has been widely debated across 
diverse development-oriented disciplines, particularly with reference to developing countries where its 
engagement during both the post-independence and post-cold era has been expansively remarkable.  
With contemporary context of development assistance discourse in the aftermath of post-cold war,
countries transitioning from the devastation of intra-state post-conflict wars or societies confronted 
with excruciating endogenous development dilemma, the notion of development assistance has been 
conceived as an integral pillar which can largely effects a social change in the social structural 
challenges of these societies, especially challenges hovering on underdevelopment, economic 
stagnation, poverty, and the overall management of a functional state for the sustenance of global 
stability etc. 
Firmly established within the global development discourse, development assistance has become 
an embodiment of the United Nations system, and its reflection among others was made perceptible in 
the outcome of the United Nations World Summit in 2005, where it became exposed that ‘peace and 
security and development and human rights, in particular are cogitated as interconnected elements and 
therefore reciprocally reinforcing’ (Gisselquist 2018, United Nations 2018, Wennmann 2009: 83). 
Recognition of development assistance for liberal post-conflict peacebuilding, the United Nations 
established Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 through which countries in transition from war to 
stability are financially assisted as a pillar to prevent post-conflict degeneration into fresh warfare
(Scott 2012). This has also been part of the international financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and also through bilateral and regional means. Thus, development 
assistance has remained to be conceived as one of the most post-cold war development methodologies
situated both in the post-conflict and in an underdeveloped context characterize with harsh socio-
economic difficulties, and are countries found in what Paul Collier pigeon-holed as ‘Bottom Billion,’ 
where unstable democratization, underdevelopment and instabilities have remained rife (see Collier 
2007).  Moreover, beyond this conceived normative construct of development assistance for the less 
developed countries, the outcome itself has yielded insignificant consequent particularly spanning the 
several decades of its existence in the aid dependent countries, where many Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries being a typical archetype. 
Thus, this chapter asserts that a profound appreciation of development assistance management 
challenge in aid driven societies particularly of the Sub-Saharan Africa region cannot be fully 
conceptualized without due consideration of the political environment and the behavioral patterns of 
existing political party system that form the political environment and of which, political parties are 
institutions of human creation that often metamorphosed into the formation of government at state 
level.  Political parties and the pattern of strategic politics underlined in their practices in the less 
democratized environment, provides unique conceptual argument on the challenge of the management 
of development aid. This endogenous propositional assertion does not imply however that, exogenous 
variables are not causally significant in the analysis of the challenge of aid in the recipient states. Yet, 
the argument infers that the appreciation of the complex endogenous variables from the viewpoint of 
domestic politics, is an essential foundation to better acknowledge the patterns of the existential 
challenge sometimes pose by externalities. 
Institutions, noted Karol Soltan (2008:60), are an outcome of politics, and as outcome of such 
complex interactions it can be destabilizing, in the senses that, it has the proclivity to scuttled ‘social 
order.’ Political parties as institutions of the state are an outgrowth of human interactions, a pattern 
reflected is the policies professed within them. Institutional policies or political party campaigned 
policies as an embodiment are what metamorphosed into the formation of state government policies 
within which development assistance largely operates in the transformation of societies. This means 
that aid provided to recipient states falls within the current political agenda or policies of the political 
regime and in many countries, incumbent government demands development aid donors to aligned aid 
projects or assistance within their current government policies, and this has become largely a kind of 
modus operandi taken for granted in many societies, including Sierra Leone. But the foundational 
policies inherent within state political parties that metamorphosed into full time government policies 
of countries in the less democratized and heterogeneous environment, have largely not been founded 
on a national development framework.  
In a widely polarized environment challenge by problem of societal cohesion, and increased 
penchant for particularities that appears to be deeply rooted, instrumentalization of political party 
policies within the political structure by the political actors through strategic interactive means are 
what informed the pattern of governance of those societies not necessary to effect change but as
conduit through which they could have access to the state economic opportunities over other adherents.
The context of post-conflict Sierra Leone provides this typical example, where political parties 
between the period 2002 to 2018 projected policies that have been utilized as government tools that 
attracted huge development assistance superficially conceived might lead to fundamental social 
change as a post-conflict country, nonetheless, its post-conflict development remains stagnated and 
one of the poorest countries in the Sub-Saharan Region. Thus, the central question of this essay is: To 
what extent were the policies or campaigned manifestoes of the successive political parties that 
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metamorphosed into the formation of post-conflict governments from 2002 to 2018 in Sierra Leone on
which development aid was largely concentrated, built on a national development framework or a
national buy-in? 
Causal explanation of social phenomenon is fundamental and foundational for a scholarly inquiry. 
Particularly at societal level, causal explanation of social phenomenon has been viewed from wide-
ranging perspectives. Two excerpts from such context is typical in the analytical viewpoint by Emile 
Durkheim on one hand, and Georg Simmel and Max Weber on the other etc. For Emile Durkheim, he 
has long postulated that ‘institutions, roles, rules and structures’ of societal settings are the integral 
pillars that should set the agenda for the understanding of society and not individual concentration in 
analytical inquiry (Barney and Felin 2013:139). For Georg Simmel and Max Weber, individual actors 
are the fundamental pillars for social inquiries. This context implies that, the creed, inclinations, and 
interest of actors in society are the useful insight from within which concepts of social structures have 
emerged and evolved (Barney and Felin 2013:139). These two phenomena explain the complexity of 
society, and largely so for causality analysis. The current chapter complimentarily builds on both 
patterns to interchangeably present the study on Sierra Leone, as its combination provides an 
instructive insight in the appreciation of complex societal phenomenon.
Social structures often associated with societies are merely an outcome of social interactions, and 
not as fundamentally a natural given condition. This pattern is beyond the naturalistic or positivist 
perspectives where social phenomenon can be taken for granted as a natural given pattern. Such 
perspective underestimates essential interactions within societies, and the outcome of those 
interactions that invariably result into structures. This essay conceives that conceptualizing the 
dilemma of development assistance particularly for countries in transition, either from a post-conflict 
or underdeveloped into a stable or developed country, can be profoundly instructive and compelling 
when extensive analysis focused on the strategic interactive behavioral pattern between domestic 
political parties of aid dependent states. These are generally not a naturally given adhesion, but a 
socially constructed pattern and structure as outcome of societal interactions of actors. 
Conceptually, the concept of strategic interaction is a widely used analytical framework 
explaining foundational social phenomenon of societies, particularly regarding actor’s calculation that 
culminate to social structures in society. Sociologist Erving Goffman provided the theoretical 
inference of strategic interaction as: 
‘… a situation of two or more parties find themselves in a well-structured condition of 
mutual impingement where each party must take a move and where every possible 
move carries fateful implications for all the parties. In this situation, each player must 
influence his own decision by his knowing that the other players are likely to try to 
dope out his decision in advance, and may even appreciate that he knows this is likely.  
Courses of action or moves will then be made in light of one’s thoughts about the 
other’s thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves made on the basis of this kind 
of orientation to self and others can be called strategic interaction…  Strategic 
interaction also involves decision making- decision made by directly orienting oneself 
to the other parties and giving weight to their situation as they would seem to see it, 
including their giving weight to one’s own. The special possibilities that result from 
this mutually assessed mutual assessment, as these effect the fate of the parties, 
provide reason and grounds for employing the special perspectives of strategic 
interaction’ (Goffman 1969: 100-101).  
Building on this concept, the case study on Sierra Leone is aptly situated. Following the aftermath 
of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2002, the political climate in which post-conflict political parties 
emerged and operated was characterized by an extreme competitive political practice and this was 
largely informed by the unbridled anticipation of political parties to secure control of the political
space at any cost, particularly given the context that in the post-conflict era, politics was conceived as 
the means to the only state political economy and its access would imply excessive power and control 
of state finance and regulation of the political and economic behavior of others. A country such as 
Sierra Leone, unlike other societies characterized by diversified economic generation, it is politics that 
became the main political economy and it came to be considered as the mainstay for political actors to 
exercise their power and control. However, the political environment in the post-conflict period 
dictated changed in the pattern of political practice. Political parties were confronted with the 
challenge of fundamental social structural change at party and at national level. The challenge of 
social change was confronted with their adherence to the liberal post-conflict political democratization,
and development normative policies at the level of political party policies or in campaign manifestoes
that became as significant for political parties in order for their continued relevance in the political 
configuration for peacebuilding.
On the basis of this trend, strategically instrumentalized policy approaches were variedly adopted 
by the two main political parties, the Sierra Leone People’s Party and the All People’s Congress Party 
on which policies of governments were constituted between 2002 and 2018. As this chapter argues, 
none of these policies adopted within these periods at the political party level which eventually 
metamorphosed into government policies were fundamentally founded on a cohesive national 
development framework by the successive political regimes. Rather, their used were merely a pattern 
of strategic interactions instrumentally employed in the immediate post-war political governance 
system as a calculative conduit merely to have accessed to state power in which development aid was
hugely deployed for post-conflict development, as aid became mainly the central post-conflict political 
economy of the country extremely relied upon within the state politics. 
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Additionally, on account of the strategic interactive pattern employed within the type political 
system, resulted to an uncoordinated development policy linkage between the political parties, as 
gaining political power became much paramount than on collaborative agenda for post-conflict 
peacebuilding within the political circle.  For instance, development policies pursued by one political 
party in one political regime often immediately become irrelevant or repudiated by another political 
party that succeeds the regime. Such pattern, because of the cohesive absence of national development 
approach it became a recurrent practice that has defined the pattern of the political culture. Tracing the 
challenge of the management of development aid in the immediate post-conflict Sierra Leone cannot 
be unconnected to the policy environment within successive governments. Generally, collaborative 
agenda within the political space across parties was seen could undermine political party support base 
and by extension reduce membership representation in party strongholds. The choice of building on a 
disjointed policy approach to maintain status quo has been taken for granted within the nature of the 
political practice and have remained largely informed by ethnic and regional identity manipulation as 
a means of party policy advocacy to elections as oppose cross-cutting policy ideas for national 
development.  Consequently, the challenge of the management of development aid in Sierra Leone, is 
characterized by a deeply-rooted policy failure, as existed policies at governmental level are informed 
by political party policies instrumentally designed as an outgrowth of the strategic interactive pattern 
used as channel for the sole purpose of capturing the political space. 
In their work, ‘Aid, Policies and Growth,’ Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000) established 
firm causational association between aid and policies, and showcase how such correlation bolster 
development in aid recipient states. Burnside and Dollars examined fifty recipient countries in the 
period between 1970s and 1993, and they specifically focused on the pattern of the existing regulatory 
framework in those societies with the impacts of development assistance. The scholars statistically 
concluded that, provision of development assistance in a state where effective and systematic 
regulatory framework does not exist, aid could therefore not create impact. The implication of their 
conclusion is that, transformation and effectiveness of development assistance is largely dependent on 
effective policy environment, and usually policy environment is defines by the nature of the political 
system that exist, and the structured pattern on which the government is constituted. Particularly with 
the party system in Africa, Carrie Manning (2016:101-112) described it as entirely different from 
those of the advanced democracies. Manning referred to the pattern of Africa political system as 
‘politically polarized immutably structured along cleavage lines.’ This pattern of fixated Africa 
political system could be considered as challenging to the trend of social change in the politics and 
governance of many of her societies.
Sierra Leone in its post-conflict political system structurally patterned along strategic interaction 
where ethnoregional-neopatrimonial (Kallon 2020) phenomenon is deeply established in the 
governance system as a political culture, such feature undermines effective policy guidance on 
national development framework in which development aid management is perceived could enhance 
growth and consolidate peace. Also, the flourish of strategic interaction by political actors informed 
mainly by extreme penchant for economic gains than on collaborative policy for strategic development 
could also largely undermine the management of development assistance. The challenge of the 
management of development aid has been reflected in the range of so-called development policies 
adopted and progressed since 2002 to 2018, by the pattern of the political parties.  
The essay used a qualitative methodological approach in data gathering, and in analysis. Random 
and purposeful instruments were used in this process for data gathering from the field research 
conducted through an unstructured interview as data collection method that was meant purely not to 
fundamentally guide this work but to merely gauge the different perspectives. However, large desk 
review and relevant archival literature, participant observation, scholarly books and modicum internet 
sources formed the bedrock for the data sources that informed the analysis of this study. The 
subsequent sections of this chapter have two sections. In section one, it discussed briefly the historical 
antecedent of development assistance ontology, and some of the main conceptual scholarly debates.  
In section two, it outlines Sierra Leone within the current debates on aid, and the mechanism through 
which the challenge of the management of development aid in the country have been patterned and 
conceptualized.  The chapter ends with a conclusion. 
2. Summarized overview of development assistance in historical context
From historic account, development assistance became extremely notable following the end of World 
War II, where massive devastation was bequeathed on Western Europe, and through which the agenda 
of ‘Marshall Plan’ emerged to accelerate reconstruction through massive economic assistance as
means of recovery process. The Marshall Plan was conceived as a bold economic policy of 
development assistance for reconstruction, of which the sum of ‘US$ 13 billion’ was committed in 
rebuilding Western Europe from 1948 to 1951 that was administered through the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (DeLong and Eichengreen 1991, Picard and Karasia 2015: 11-24).  
Moreover, the United States in the form of development assistance also economically assisted 
Japan, its former war enemy for reconstruction which laid the model for what development assistance 
would be conceptualized. Nonetheless, beyond this minimal viewport, the broader agenda of the 
extensive economic assistance to Japan and Western Europe reconstruction was also not without 
political ideological interest, as was also geared towards conflating alliances against the Soviet Union 
Communist ideological penetration from establishing global impact during the emergence of postwar 
squabbles, dubbed as the Cold War confrontation (Picard and Karasia 2015:11-24).  Followed to the 
Marshall Plan, was the Point Four Program as a Foreign Policy orientation, that was also 
intellectualized within development assistance of President, Harry S. Truman, of the United States, 
built upon technical international development assistance but strategically deeply rooted in interest-
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rebuilding Western Europe from 1948 to 1951 that was administered through the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (DeLong and Eichengreen 1991, Picard and Karasia 2015: 11-24).  
Moreover, the United States in the form of development assistance also economically assisted 
Japan, its former war enemy for reconstruction which laid the model for what development assistance 
would be conceptualized. Nonetheless, beyond this minimal viewport, the broader agenda of the 
extensive economic assistance to Japan and Western Europe reconstruction was also not without 
political ideological interest, as was also geared towards conflating alliances against the Soviet Union 
Communist ideological penetration from establishing global impact during the emergence of postwar 
squabbles, dubbed as the Cold War confrontation (Picard and Karasia 2015:11-24).  Followed to the 
Marshall Plan, was the Point Four Program as a Foreign Policy orientation, that was also 
intellectualized within development assistance of President, Harry S. Truman, of the United States, 
built upon technical international development assistance but strategically deeply rooted in interest-
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based conceptualization (Picard and Karasia 2015, Zeiler 2015). 
Development assistance of the Point Four Program mainly in the form of technical assistance 
which began in earnest 1949-1950, coincided with wave of independence of which the newly 
independent states were considered within the spate of political correctness, but strategically as those 
in dire need of development, especially in Africa, Latin America and some locations in Asia, which 
beneath it was also a strategy to curb communist amplification among these newly independent states 
especially in the wake of colonial disintegration. As noted by Jacob J. Kaplan (1950): 
‘We are living through a period of international crisis during which our economic 
strength is one of the most effective tools we have for promoting peace. United States 
Foreign Aid has been a powerful instrument for strengthening orderly social processes 
in an era during which the exploitation of poverty, of bleak economic horizons, and of 
frustration of even modest national aspirations threatens both our national security and 
the peace of the world.’
Whilst development assistance in many respects was perceived as having undisguised ideological 
undertone on its onset, yet, was also phenomenal in responding to the less developed societies as stark 
underdevelopment was conceived as threat to global stability and peace. This led to the need for 
development assistance expansion in orientation particularly towards structural transformation in the 
economic and political context of these less developed states in which, concept of modernization 
became the catchy phrase (Picard and Karasia 2015). But in the Africa continent and in the wave of 
the postwar II climate, such pattern and advocacy began in earnest after the end of the Cold war 
tension in the 1989.
Tracing development assistance in Africa is dated as far back to many centuries ago. Yet, at 
bilateral level prominent and outstanding process tracing of its tracking have come to be distinctly 
centered particularly around the era of Cold War, when the East and West Bloc propped different 
political regimes during the wave of political ideological contestations for alliance formation 
(Schraeder et.al 1998, Boschini and Olofsgard 2007, Ball and Johnson 1996). Equally important 
within such era, was also the economic leitmotif considered as strong underpinned factor that attracted 
earliest foreign aid operationalization in Africa. This is noted in the work by Peter J. Schraeder, Steven 
W. Hook and Bruce Taylor (1998), which noted Japan’s foreign aid  intensification to Africa as 
largely driven by economic interest especially in 1980s, that were predicated on the need for ‘raw 
materials like copper, uranium and chromium from Zambia, Niger and Madagascar etc., and market,’ 
whilst at the same time, foreign assistance from France, as noted by the authors, was concentrated 
towards it former colonized states and other French speaking countries as underlined strategy in 
consolidating ‘French cultural nationalism’ (1998:312-319). From the perspective of rational choice 
argument, it is explicit that the authors emphasized among others the underlined conceptualization of 
assistance development especially from historical context and its evolution inherent within an 
interdependent relationship. 
At the multinational level, development assistance in Africa beginning 1980s was largely linked 
with structural adjustment program, instituted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in which structural conditionalities became the main linchpin for the devolution of development 
assistance in Africa, some part in Asia and Latin America.  In the post-cold war, its largely appeared 
that development assistance within such epistemological advancement have not been compelling, but 
seems to be linked towards some assumed strands of development undertone, nonetheless, it was still 
very critical and widely ambivalent whether development assistance have any correctional link to 
development, particularly in the states it is meant to be impactful.   
Perhaps, taking from the context of cold war experiences in the context of path dependent 
perspective, this critical juncture period could underline why numerous scholarly accounts remain 
sustained in arguments about development assistance as purely along principles of interest (Mckinlay 
and Little 1978, Griffin and Enos 1970, Boschini and Olofsgard 2007, Maizels and Nissanke 1984). At 
the same time, extended arguments around its utilization and interaction is believed to be 
conceptualized along reciprocal approach mainly between givers and receivers (Alesina and Dollar 
2000). These deeply rooted phenomenal viewpoints have remained firmly established in dominant 
literatures on development theories between the interaction of both the global north and the global 
south states, and for the most part, have also progressed within the analysis of the behavioral pattern of 
the newly emerging countries from the global south which set forth to becoming major players within 
the donors’ club circle. Also, the relationship between development assistance and national growth of 
recipient countries has not been feasible in realistic term, if any, it widely undermines it (Griffin and 
Enos 1970). 
In the apparent post-conflict countries, particularly in intra-state postwar climate type of the 
developing countries characterized by complex emergencies of war devastation, underdevelopment,
and poverty etc., development assistance has been conceived as an essential pillar in their recovery 
processes, in particular, underscored by the motive of preventing their relapse. This notion is advanced 
by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2007:731-736), who noted that such intervention engendered 
poverty reduction and the acceleration of growth. Additionally, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler further 
reiterated that the sustainability of countries at war end, depends largely on effective policy 
development and development assistance which together combines to diminish danger of post-conflict 
countries from relapsing into fresh warfare (Collier and Hoeffler 2002. Also see Collier et al. 2003).  
While such model has the tendency to yield result, nonetheless, the scholars’ shortcomings lie in 
the challenge of concentrating more on the normative existence of policy and development aid in 
context, but with insignificant concentration on the effective implementation of those mechanisms. 
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based conceptualization (Picard and Karasia 2015, Zeiler 2015). 
Development assistance of the Point Four Program mainly in the form of technical assistance 
which began in earnest 1949-1950, coincided with wave of independence of which the newly 
independent states were considered within the spate of political correctness, but strategically as those 
in dire need of development, especially in Africa, Latin America and some locations in Asia, which 
beneath it was also a strategy to curb communist amplification among these newly independent states 
especially in the wake of colonial disintegration. As noted by Jacob J. Kaplan (1950): 
‘We are living through a period of international crisis during which our economic 
strength is one of the most effective tools we have for promoting peace. United States 
Foreign Aid has been a powerful instrument for strengthening orderly social processes 
in an era during which the exploitation of poverty, of bleak economic horizons, and of 
frustration of even modest national aspirations threatens both our national security and 
the peace of the world.’
Whilst development assistance in many respects was perceived as having undisguised ideological 
undertone on its onset, yet, was also phenomenal in responding to the less developed societies as stark 
underdevelopment was conceived as threat to global stability and peace. This led to the need for 
development assistance expansion in orientation particularly towards structural transformation in the 
economic and political context of these less developed states in which, concept of modernization 
became the catchy phrase (Picard and Karasia 2015). But in the Africa continent and in the wave of 
the postwar II climate, such pattern and advocacy began in earnest after the end of the Cold war 
tension in the 1989.
Tracing development assistance in Africa is dated as far back to many centuries ago. Yet, at 
bilateral level prominent and outstanding process tracing of its tracking have come to be distinctly 
centered particularly around the era of Cold War, when the East and West Bloc propped different 
political regimes during the wave of political ideological contestations for alliance formation 
(Schraeder et.al 1998, Boschini and Olofsgard 2007, Ball and Johnson 1996). Equally important 
within such era, was also the economic leitmotif considered as strong underpinned factor that attracted 
earliest foreign aid operationalization in Africa. This is noted in the work by Peter J. Schraeder, Steven 
W. Hook and Bruce Taylor (1998), which noted Japan’s foreign aid  intensification to Africa as 
largely driven by economic interest especially in 1980s, that were predicated on the need for ‘raw 
materials like copper, uranium and chromium from Zambia, Niger and Madagascar etc., and market,’ 
whilst at the same time, foreign assistance from France, as noted by the authors, was concentrated 
towards it former colonized states and other French speaking countries as underlined strategy in 
consolidating ‘French cultural nationalism’ (1998:312-319). From the perspective of rational choice 
argument, it is explicit that the authors emphasized among others the underlined conceptualization of 
assistance development especially from historical context and its evolution inherent within an 
interdependent relationship. 
At the multinational level, development assistance in Africa beginning 1980s was largely linked 
with structural adjustment program, instituted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in which structural conditionalities became the main linchpin for the devolution of development 
assistance in Africa, some part in Asia and Latin America.  In the post-cold war, its largely appeared 
that development assistance within such epistemological advancement have not been compelling, but 
seems to be linked towards some assumed strands of development undertone, nonetheless, it was still 
very critical and widely ambivalent whether development assistance have any correctional link to 
development, particularly in the states it is meant to be impactful.   
Perhaps, taking from the context of cold war experiences in the context of path dependent 
perspective, this critical juncture period could underline why numerous scholarly accounts remain 
sustained in arguments about development assistance as purely along principles of interest (Mckinlay 
and Little 1978, Griffin and Enos 1970, Boschini and Olofsgard 2007, Maizels and Nissanke 1984). At 
the same time, extended arguments around its utilization and interaction is believed to be 
conceptualized along reciprocal approach mainly between givers and receivers (Alesina and Dollar 
2000). These deeply rooted phenomenal viewpoints have remained firmly established in dominant 
literatures on development theories between the interaction of both the global north and the global 
south states, and for the most part, have also progressed within the analysis of the behavioral pattern of 
the newly emerging countries from the global south which set forth to becoming major players within 
the donors’ club circle. Also, the relationship between development assistance and national growth of 
recipient countries has not been feasible in realistic term, if any, it widely undermines it (Griffin and 
Enos 1970). 
In the apparent post-conflict countries, particularly in intra-state postwar climate type of the 
developing countries characterized by complex emergencies of war devastation, underdevelopment,
and poverty etc., development assistance has been conceived as an essential pillar in their recovery 
processes, in particular, underscored by the motive of preventing their relapse. This notion is advanced 
by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2007:731-736), who noted that such intervention engendered 
poverty reduction and the acceleration of growth. Additionally, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler further 
reiterated that the sustainability of countries at war end, depends largely on effective policy 
development and development assistance which together combines to diminish danger of post-conflict 
countries from relapsing into fresh warfare (Collier and Hoeffler 2002. Also see Collier et al. 2003).  
While such model has the tendency to yield result, nonetheless, the scholars’ shortcomings lie in 
the challenge of concentrating more on the normative existence of policy and development aid in 
context, but with insignificant concentration on the effective implementation of those mechanisms. 
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Many post conflict countries, including Sierra Leone have had both aid and varied policies following 
the end of the country’s civil war, however, the component of effective implementation is considered 
to be largely displaced. Such factor could be a demonstration of poor institutional reform where the 
absorptive ability from within domestic states not harnessed for a long-term liberal post-conflict 
peacebuilding process. 
2.1. Contextual debates on the efficacy of development assistance 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) also known as aid or foreign assistance is characterized by 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2016: 194) as ‘government aid to 
developing countries aimed to promote economic development and welfare of recipient countries…’ 
‘It further states that, aid may be provided bilaterally from donor to recipient or channeled through 
multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank or the United Nations etc…’ Additionally, 
it also asserts that ‘aid comprises grants, soft loan and provision of technical assistance,’ (Also see 
Lancaster 1999).  On account of this characterization, ODA is conceived to be apparently engrossed in 
a binary fusion along two continua in an asymmetric power relation, binds together on negotiated 
institutional power conditionalities. In development assistance discourse the strategic power relations 
between donors and recipient countries is made visualized through conditionalities. Conditionality in 
this context is illustrated by Phillip Dann (2013:360) as ‘any regulations that a donor attaches 
unilaterally to an official development assistance payment or any sanction that it attaches to non-
fulfillment.’  
Therefore, development assistance and conditionalities are underscored as compatible and 
inseparable framework oriented towards advancing development in the developing countries of the 
global south. Thus, there have emerged unabated scholarly debates on what epistemological 
relationship underlined the ontology or reality of development assistance and its conditionality, as well 
as the effectiveness in the so-called recipient countries. In what appears as the critical school 
perspective, Gordon Crawford (1997) in his examination of development assistance with its associated 
conditionalities which is patterned along the political construct, opined that the associated notion of 
conditionality has been blatantly ‘inconsistent’ and ‘ineffective’ in the attempt towards reform agenda 
in the donor dependent states. On consistency, Gordon Crawford survey examined few countries on 
how aid conditionalities were dispensed. The conclusion of Crawford’s work revealed that, the 
application of drastic conditionality was more pronounced in countries of less economic interest to the
donors, and less or nonexistent in countries where donors have maximum economic interest, even 
though, as noted by Crawford, human rights and governance challenges were at an alarmed rate in 
such societies. For instance, he indicated that, especially in the early 1990s the case of Nigeria, Turkey, 
and China, suffered aid sanctions on conditionalities, whilst countries such as Indonesia, Algeria, 
Colombia, and Egypt amidst their reputational challenges of human rights and governance related 
issues the implementation of conditionalities on aid were inconsistent in these states. On effectiveness, 
Gordon Crawford further specified that many conditionalities that are applied in certain countries are 
weak in nature, wherein certain recipient countries with influential internal mechanism such weak 
imposed conditionalities could not yield dividend. Finally, Gordon Crawford work attempts to point 
out that legitimacy is compromised on development assistance framework.
Furthermore, Tobias Hagmann and Filip Reyntjens (2016) attempted to explain how development 
assistance that is meant to promote reforms and development within liberal architecture, have resulted 
into producing strong correlation and maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Sub Saharan Africa 
countries. These authors accounted that, what donors have wrongly assumed as development projects 
in certain Sub Saharan Africa states are completely a mistaken notion to the broader objective of 
liberal democratic promotion. In that, the author continued, such development assistance has 
underpinned the consolidation of authoritarian regimes as oppose to fostering democratic 
consolidation, and cited the case of Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia in 2013 in particular. 
The authors specified that, these four countries were the top highest recipients of development aid in 
2013, and yet were under a single party-political system where political pluralism and dissension, 
considered as fundamental pillars for democratic consolidation were completely proscribed within 
these states. Additionally, the authors noted that from 1990s to 2013, development assistance in Sub 
Saharan Africa States have been realized more in countries with low adherence to political rights as 
oppose to those with improved adherence to these fundamental rights, hence, emphasized that in the 
endeavor of development promotion, development assistance has systematically consolidated 
authoritarian regimes than democracy. Thus, they argued that certain Sub Saharan Africa countries on 
aid are in the context of ‘development but without democracy.
Equally important on the continued ambivalent position on aid, is the work by Stephen Knack 
(2004). Stephen Knack draws to attention the question around the correlation between aid and 
democratization. The author argued that, development assistance has no fundamental fact that it leads 
to democratization in recipient states, rather, the author continued, aid merely build upon the 
preexisting efforts on democracy that have been in existence in those recipient states which aid 
relatively contributes to its promotion, and not necessarily as the source of its emergence. He 
advanced this argument by utilizing a multivariate test, which examined the political and civil liberty 
of Freedom House data set from Large-N cross country approach in the period from 1975 to 2000. 
Stephen Knack specified that from 1975 to 1989, aid did not establish democratization as well as in 
the period from 1990 to 1999, therefore, in places where much development assistance appeared to be 
situated with evidence of relative success, are dependent on those prior democratic advances made and 
not necessarily that it can be appreciated to have been occasioned by aid.  The work of Stephen Knack 
in summary refutes arguments that have been tailored on the correlation between aid democratization 
as conceptually ineffective. 
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Many post conflict countries, including Sierra Leone have had both aid and varied policies following 
the end of the country’s civil war, however, the component of effective implementation is considered 
to be largely displaced. Such factor could be a demonstration of poor institutional reform where the 
absorptive ability from within domestic states not harnessed for a long-term liberal post-conflict 
peacebuilding process. 
2.1. Contextual debates on the efficacy of development assistance 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) also known as aid or foreign assistance is characterized by 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2016: 194) as ‘government aid to 
developing countries aimed to promote economic development and welfare of recipient countries…’ 
‘It further states that, aid may be provided bilaterally from donor to recipient or channeled through 
multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank or the United Nations etc…’ Additionally, 
it also asserts that ‘aid comprises grants, soft loan and provision of technical assistance,’ (Also see 
Lancaster 1999).  On account of this characterization, ODA is conceived to be apparently engrossed in 
a binary fusion along two continua in an asymmetric power relation, binds together on negotiated 
institutional power conditionalities. In development assistance discourse the strategic power relations 
between donors and recipient countries is made visualized through conditionalities. Conditionality in 
this context is illustrated by Phillip Dann (2013:360) as ‘any regulations that a donor attaches 
unilaterally to an official development assistance payment or any sanction that it attaches to non-
fulfillment.’  
Therefore, development assistance and conditionalities are underscored as compatible and 
inseparable framework oriented towards advancing development in the developing countries of the 
global south. Thus, there have emerged unabated scholarly debates on what epistemological 
relationship underlined the ontology or reality of development assistance and its conditionality, as well 
as the effectiveness in the so-called recipient countries. In what appears as the critical school 
perspective, Gordon Crawford (1997) in his examination of development assistance with its associated 
conditionalities which is patterned along the political construct, opined that the associated notion of 
conditionality has been blatantly ‘inconsistent’ and ‘ineffective’ in the attempt towards reform agenda 
in the donor dependent states. On consistency, Gordon Crawford survey examined few countries on 
how aid conditionalities were dispensed. The conclusion of Crawford’s work revealed that, the 
application of drastic conditionality was more pronounced in countries of less economic interest to the
donors, and less or nonexistent in countries where donors have maximum economic interest, even 
though, as noted by Crawford, human rights and governance challenges were at an alarmed rate in 
such societies. For instance, he indicated that, especially in the early 1990s the case of Nigeria, Turkey, 
and China, suffered aid sanctions on conditionalities, whilst countries such as Indonesia, Algeria, 
Colombia, and Egypt amidst their reputational challenges of human rights and governance related 
issues the implementation of conditionalities on aid were inconsistent in these states. On effectiveness, 
Gordon Crawford further specified that many conditionalities that are applied in certain countries are 
weak in nature, wherein certain recipient countries with influential internal mechanism such weak 
imposed conditionalities could not yield dividend. Finally, Gordon Crawford work attempts to point 
out that legitimacy is compromised on development assistance framework.
Furthermore, Tobias Hagmann and Filip Reyntjens (2016) attempted to explain how development 
assistance that is meant to promote reforms and development within liberal architecture, have resulted 
into producing strong correlation and maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Sub Saharan Africa 
countries. These authors accounted that, what donors have wrongly assumed as development projects 
in certain Sub Saharan Africa states are completely a mistaken notion to the broader objective of 
liberal democratic promotion. In that, the author continued, such development assistance has 
underpinned the consolidation of authoritarian regimes as oppose to fostering democratic 
consolidation, and cited the case of Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia in 2013 in particular. 
The authors specified that, these four countries were the top highest recipients of development aid in 
2013, and yet were under a single party-political system where political pluralism and dissension, 
considered as fundamental pillars for democratic consolidation were completely proscribed within 
these states. Additionally, the authors noted that from 1990s to 2013, development assistance in Sub 
Saharan Africa States have been realized more in countries with low adherence to political rights as 
oppose to those with improved adherence to these fundamental rights, hence, emphasized that in the 
endeavor of development promotion, development assistance has systematically consolidated 
authoritarian regimes than democracy. Thus, they argued that certain Sub Saharan Africa countries on 
aid are in the context of ‘development but without democracy.
Equally important on the continued ambivalent position on aid, is the work by Stephen Knack 
(2004). Stephen Knack draws to attention the question around the correlation between aid and 
democratization. The author argued that, development assistance has no fundamental fact that it leads 
to democratization in recipient states, rather, the author continued, aid merely build upon the 
preexisting efforts on democracy that have been in existence in those recipient states which aid 
relatively contributes to its promotion, and not necessarily as the source of its emergence. He 
advanced this argument by utilizing a multivariate test, which examined the political and civil liberty 
of Freedom House data set from Large-N cross country approach in the period from 1975 to 2000. 
Stephen Knack specified that from 1975 to 1989, aid did not establish democratization as well as in 
the period from 1990 to 1999, therefore, in places where much development assistance appeared to be 
situated with evidence of relative success, are dependent on those prior democratic advances made and 
not necessarily that it can be appreciated to have been occasioned by aid.  The work of Stephen Knack 
in summary refutes arguments that have been tailored on the correlation between aid democratization 
as conceptually ineffective. 
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Also, the work by Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack (2004), profoundly underscored 
development assistance and its fundamental impact on the general governance pattern in Sub Saharan 
Africa states. They characterized aid dependency as a ‘condition in which the state is far more 
powerless to undertake and administer major responsibilities of governance within their states devoid 
of external financial assistance or assistance from external know-how.’ This phenomenon according to 
the authors is exactly what the state of Africa has been in- hugely pervaded with aid and yet, poor 
governance and institutional dilemma remains, implying that aid has much damaging impacts on 
governance superstructure of the recipient states. The scholars added that, aid engenders ‘institutional 
feebleness and tenacious inducements’ within state. In this case they stated that, development 
assistance generates a space within recipient state where the limited qualified staff in government 
structure are poached; it produces accountability dilemma and makes the dependent government 
reticent to sincerely focus on sustainable internal income generation approach such as through taxation 
from inhabitants, which might warrant the citizens to hold their respective governments accountable 
from within as a key component of democratic norm. Also, Brautigam and Knack indicated that the 
incentive and availability of large scale of aid, accelerates profound indebtedness on the state, as well 
as undermines what they referred to as the ‘collective actions problems,’ together, these illustrate 
instructive case in points among others, for the inimical association of aid governance capacity on 
recipient societies.
Sustained Development assistance and its impact on local industries within the broader context of 
development in the recipient states has also become notable in the ongoing aid debate. Typical of such 
idea is reflected in the work by Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi, Sheng Zhibin, Gao Jun, Sidi 
Yaya Sidi and Ye Pianran (2016). These authors pointed out that, particularly food aid often provided 
as development assistance undermines the local food production industries in recipient countries, as 
the proclivity of rendering their local productions undervalued and hence, stimulates the chances of an 
employability dilemma. (In this case aid might be synonymous to one of the drivers of conflict in 
certain context beyond the conventional paradigm propounded by conflict analyst scholars). The 
authors specifically cited the case of Zambia in particular, where the textile industry that used to be the 
leading producer of cotton cloths and creating employment for large sections of the population, 
however, have almost become defunct, in the senses that, it is rare to now see cotton cloths being 
produced by the local cotton as were previously, and as well for the industries. The authors affirmed 
this as a result of the extreme concentration of development aid along different approaches. 
Dambisa Moyo (2009) in her examination of the general development assistance network in 
Africa, argued that aid has been an ‘unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster.’ She 
asserted that in the last sixty years, Africa has accrued about One trillion United States Dollars in aid 
assistance, nonetheless, the real per capital income in recent time is much lower than it was in the 
1970s, and this is combined with nearly fifty percent of the population barely survive under less than a 
dollar per day, and Africa has remained extremely indebted which annual repayment of debt has 
resulted to about twenty billion United States Dollars. Dambisa Moyo in her article, situated the 
complexity of development assistance generally as both a variable caused by the convoluted context 
within which aid operates, as well as, the inherent reputed complexities in African countries. 
Amidst the above noted conceptualization of development assistance, Ngaire Woods (2005) on his 
part heralded that the apparent trend in the global society has even convoluted the primary initial 
motive of development assistance, especially after the September, 2011 episode, and the new mode 
that awakened on the war on terror. Woods highlighted that these phenomena have clouded the 
operationalization of  development assistance globally on three thematic viewpoints, which included: 
(a) that development assistance  actors as a result of the recent change in global security trend, have 
commandeered aid ambience in pursuit of their own security interest abandoning the fight against the 
collective action problems  like global poverty reduction; (b) that the emerge war on terror appears to 
be extremely capital intensive and this implies the shrinking expenditures that now directly go to 
development assistance projects and finally; (c) that emerging interest of donors not synchronizing 
their resources through multilateral organs is becoming situated, where donors instead have resolved 
to seek new space and approach through which they propelled their individual interests. In sum, with 
the critical arguments, these scholars doubt the general fundamental impacts development assistance 
can have on macroeconomic, microeconomic and the overall democratization and governance pattern 
and process in the less developed recipient states that have remained deeply oriented under the canopy 
of aid dependency.  
Contrary to the aforementioned critical school conceptualization of development assistance, 
sympathized scholars of development assistance have disseminated different perspectives on the 
effectiveness of aid in the recipient countries. Arthur A. Goldsmith (2001) advanced argument that 
development assistance has been more significant to the recipient states in aspect of the development 
of democratization and economic liberation contrarily to what he referred to as ‘Perversity Thesis’ had 
inundated. Goldsmith further situated that on account of the little correlative progress aid had 
produced on the level of governance and that of reformation in the economic sector, any attempt of 
either withholding or reducing development assistance in these societies might concomitantly have 
deleterious effect on the evidential progressed already made which would degenerate into complete 
failed state that could become an intense threat to the environment. 
Followed along this perspective, Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) also argued that, why it 
is true that development assistance has been patterned along some colonial ties, nevertheless, aid has 
been concentrated disproportionately more in countries that have appeared to be in democratization 
process, while at the same token, aid donors are demotivated in providing substantial development 
assistance to countries that have acted or produced insignificant democratization fundamentals. 
Equally important in their argument is that, aid increment in recipient countries has been relied on how 
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Also, the work by Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack (2004), profoundly underscored 
development assistance and its fundamental impact on the general governance pattern in Sub Saharan 
Africa states. They characterized aid dependency as a ‘condition in which the state is far more 
powerless to undertake and administer major responsibilities of governance within their states devoid 
of external financial assistance or assistance from external know-how.’ This phenomenon according to 
the authors is exactly what the state of Africa has been in- hugely pervaded with aid and yet, poor 
governance and institutional dilemma remains, implying that aid has much damaging impacts on 
governance superstructure of the recipient states. The scholars added that, aid engenders ‘institutional 
feebleness and tenacious inducements’ within state. In this case they stated that, development 
assistance generates a space within recipient state where the limited qualified staff in government 
structure are poached; it produces accountability dilemma and makes the dependent government 
reticent to sincerely focus on sustainable internal income generation approach such as through taxation 
from inhabitants, which might warrant the citizens to hold their respective governments accountable 
from within as a key component of democratic norm. Also, Brautigam and Knack indicated that the 
incentive and availability of large scale of aid, accelerates profound indebtedness on the state, as well 
as undermines what they referred to as the ‘collective actions problems,’ together, these illustrate 
instructive case in points among others, for the inimical association of aid governance capacity on 
recipient societies.
Sustained Development assistance and its impact on local industries within the broader context of 
development in the recipient states has also become notable in the ongoing aid debate. Typical of such 
idea is reflected in the work by Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi, Sheng Zhibin, Gao Jun, Sidi 
Yaya Sidi and Ye Pianran (2016). These authors pointed out that, particularly food aid often provided 
as development assistance undermines the local food production industries in recipient countries, as 
the proclivity of rendering their local productions undervalued and hence, stimulates the chances of an 
employability dilemma. (In this case aid might be synonymous to one of the drivers of conflict in 
certain context beyond the conventional paradigm propounded by conflict analyst scholars). The 
authors specifically cited the case of Zambia in particular, where the textile industry that used to be the 
leading producer of cotton cloths and creating employment for large sections of the population, 
however, have almost become defunct, in the senses that, it is rare to now see cotton cloths being 
produced by the local cotton as were previously, and as well for the industries. The authors affirmed 
this as a result of the extreme concentration of development aid along different approaches. 
Dambisa Moyo (2009) in her examination of the general development assistance network in 
Africa, argued that aid has been an ‘unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster.’ She 
asserted that in the last sixty years, Africa has accrued about One trillion United States Dollars in aid 
assistance, nonetheless, the real per capital income in recent time is much lower than it was in the 
1970s, and this is combined with nearly fifty percent of the population barely survive under less than a 
dollar per day, and Africa has remained extremely indebted which annual repayment of debt has 
resulted to about twenty billion United States Dollars. Dambisa Moyo in her article, situated the 
complexity of development assistance generally as both a variable caused by the convoluted context 
within which aid operates, as well as, the inherent reputed complexities in African countries. 
Amidst the above noted conceptualization of development assistance, Ngaire Woods (2005) on his 
part heralded that the apparent trend in the global society has even convoluted the primary initial 
motive of development assistance, especially after the September, 2011 episode, and the new mode 
that awakened on the war on terror. Woods highlighted that these phenomena have clouded the 
operationalization of  development assistance globally on three thematic viewpoints, which included: 
(a) that development assistance  actors as a result of the recent change in global security trend, have 
commandeered aid ambience in pursuit of their own security interest abandoning the fight against the 
collective action problems  like global poverty reduction; (b) that the emerge war on terror appears to 
be extremely capital intensive and this implies the shrinking expenditures that now directly go to 
development assistance projects and finally; (c) that emerging interest of donors not synchronizing 
their resources through multilateral organs is becoming situated, where donors instead have resolved 
to seek new space and approach through which they propelled their individual interests. In sum, with 
the critical arguments, these scholars doubt the general fundamental impacts development assistance 
can have on macroeconomic, microeconomic and the overall democratization and governance pattern 
and process in the less developed recipient states that have remained deeply oriented under the canopy 
of aid dependency.  
Contrary to the aforementioned critical school conceptualization of development assistance, 
sympathized scholars of development assistance have disseminated different perspectives on the 
effectiveness of aid in the recipient countries. Arthur A. Goldsmith (2001) advanced argument that 
development assistance has been more significant to the recipient states in aspect of the development 
of democratization and economic liberation contrarily to what he referred to as ‘Perversity Thesis’ had 
inundated. Goldsmith further situated that on account of the little correlative progress aid had 
produced on the level of governance and that of reformation in the economic sector, any attempt of 
either withholding or reducing development assistance in these societies might concomitantly have 
deleterious effect on the evidential progressed already made which would degenerate into complete 
failed state that could become an intense threat to the environment. 
Followed along this perspective, Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) also argued that, why it 
is true that development assistance has been patterned along some colonial ties, nevertheless, aid has 
been concentrated disproportionately more in countries that have appeared to be in democratization 
process, while at the same token, aid donors are demotivated in providing substantial development 
assistance to countries that have acted or produced insignificant democratization fundamentals. 
Equally important in their argument is that, aid increment in recipient countries has been relied on how 
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liberalized these countries have operated their trades and economic space which incentivizes the 
inflow of aid in such settings. However, given that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has now almost 
become conceived as an assistance to the poorly underdeveloped, which helps opens their market 
economic system for potential viability, these scholars argued that, FDI flows to recipient countries 
are not conditional to the level of democratization but on effective state rules and economic policy 
climate of the states.
In their Work, Paul Collier and David Dollar (2002), draws on the nexus between development 
assistance availability to poor recipient countries, and the impact such produced in poverty reduction. 
Collier and Dollar furthered their viewpoint that, in recipient countries where policy regulations are 
effective, it does not matter the magnitude of poverty, but the inflow of development assistance could 
fundamentally impact on poverty reduction, especially when donors build on ‘poverty-efficient 
allocation’ approach (Ibid 1482-1495). Nonetheless, these scholars reject the notion that aid has 
impact on policy reforms other than the inseparable associations between the two, which serve as 
platform through which development assistance could mitigate the poverty demands of low-income 
recipient states. Also, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp (2015) in their argument underscoring the notion that 
development assistance has been punctuated by varied underlined motives, however, situated that with 
an extensive twenty-five years examination from 1983 to 2010 of Large-N data set on aid inflows and 
pattern of its behavior, concluded strong association between development assistance and institutional 
improvement. They particularly emphasized that, in recipient states where ‘government aid’ has been 
directed towards institutional reform such interactions have produced strong and positive relational 
effect especially on political institutional reforms, and in instances where such aid has been and 
remained consistent. 
In line with this above stated argument, Zohid Askarov and Hristos Doucouliagos (2015) 
examined thirty-two countries for twenty-three years to understand the nexus between aid and it 
impacts on transforming institutions. They observed that, development assistance can underwrite 
democratization in a transition economy, but however noted that, such does not assure the efficacy of 
good institutional behavioral performance or output which is often referred to as good governance. 
Whilst addressing the fluidity in their argument on the aspect aid leading to democratization but low 
impact on good governance, the authors stated that, development assistance especially in states that
are in transition and also immature, are accompanied by erratic result on both the ‘democracy and 
good governance’ regarding their transformation, and that immature nature of the state in transition 
might results in affecting the quality of governance, which does not necessarily implies that, there is 
no relations between aid and democracy based on their statistical analysis.
In conclusion, as outlined in the reviewed it fundamentally shows wide range of perspectives on 
the conceptual appreciation of development assistance. Yet, why scholars in their attempt explained 
about the how and why questions of development assistance generally, still, conceptual and instructive 
perspectives on particularly the challenge of the management of development aid in certain recipient 
states needed further contribution to the existing scholarship. Particularly important is the aspect of 
policies that underlined domestic political parties, policies which eventually transformed into 
government in these states. Policy development or adoption at political party level is the outcome of 
political actors’ behavioral patterns. The behavioral pattern of political actors within mainstream 
political environment is guided by strategic actions, and in the less democratized states, such 
behavioral actions are always informed by instrumentalized motive manipulatively designed in pursuit 
of certain interests as long as there are no strong institutions that check their excesses. 
The overall agenda of this pattern can be informed by what Erving Goffman referred to as 
‘strategic interactions.’  In Sierra Leone, in the aftermath of the new political dispensation where 
antiquated political practices were to give way to the liberal democratic paradigm, political actors 
resulted into the practice of strategic political interactions using their political parties in adopting 
policies that were fundamentally instrumentalized, policies that could make them appeared as 
transformed yet, remains with practices of old political tricks, and it was within this pattern
development aid inflows accelerated conceived post-conflict development could be attained. Such 
policies of the parties were in dearth of a nationally planned approach, and were more of a calculated 
strategy by one party or other competing to maintain their hold and access to the state economic 
resource and power to control inflows of external support, whilst at the same operated politics of 
exclusion which thereby undermined the prospect for national development agenda to flourished. In 
the post-conflict development assistance challenge context of Sierra Leone, it is this strategic role of 
the political actors within which aid has become a monumental failure in the fifteen years of the liberal 
peacebuilding process. 
Political party policies or manifestos which are the foundation on which many governments have 
been constituted particularly governments in some of the less democratized, underdeveloped and 
multi-ethnic states, are largely not founded on fundamental transformative conception. Rather, these 
party policies when examined substantively, they largely appear pseudo in nature, and designed 
merely as an ideational strategy to secure political control of the state political opportunities. 
Particularly in multi-ethnic societies, competition for elections for instance, by the so-called political 
parties are not absolutely contested or founded on ideas, but are elections that are characterized by 
ethnic censusing, where identity becomes the Machiavellian instrument.
3. Sierra Leone post-conflict development assistance in context
As noted by Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout (1966), in the contemporary thinking of conceptual 
thoughts on development, concurrence have appeared among scholars that deteriorated ‘economic 
progress, poverty and underdevelopment of states can be enhanced through explorations and 
investments in areas such as human capital development, acceleration of state investment and savings, 
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liberalized these countries have operated their trades and economic space which incentivizes the 
inflow of aid in such settings. However, given that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has now almost 
become conceived as an assistance to the poorly underdeveloped, which helps opens their market 
economic system for potential viability, these scholars argued that, FDI flows to recipient countries 
are not conditional to the level of democratization but on effective state rules and economic policy 
climate of the states.
In their Work, Paul Collier and David Dollar (2002), draws on the nexus between development 
assistance availability to poor recipient countries, and the impact such produced in poverty reduction. 
Collier and Dollar furthered their viewpoint that, in recipient countries where policy regulations are 
effective, it does not matter the magnitude of poverty, but the inflow of development assistance could 
fundamentally impact on poverty reduction, especially when donors build on ‘poverty-efficient 
allocation’ approach (Ibid 1482-1495). Nonetheless, these scholars reject the notion that aid has 
impact on policy reforms other than the inseparable associations between the two, which serve as 
platform through which development assistance could mitigate the poverty demands of low-income 
recipient states. Also, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp (2015) in their argument underscoring the notion that 
development assistance has been punctuated by varied underlined motives, however, situated that with 
an extensive twenty-five years examination from 1983 to 2010 of Large-N data set on aid inflows and 
pattern of its behavior, concluded strong association between development assistance and institutional 
improvement. They particularly emphasized that, in recipient states where ‘government aid’ has been 
directed towards institutional reform such interactions have produced strong and positive relational 
effect especially on political institutional reforms, and in instances where such aid has been and 
remained consistent. 
In line with this above stated argument, Zohid Askarov and Hristos Doucouliagos (2015) 
examined thirty-two countries for twenty-three years to understand the nexus between aid and it 
impacts on transforming institutions. They observed that, development assistance can underwrite 
democratization in a transition economy, but however noted that, such does not assure the efficacy of 
good institutional behavioral performance or output which is often referred to as good governance. 
Whilst addressing the fluidity in their argument on the aspect aid leading to democratization but low 
impact on good governance, the authors stated that, development assistance especially in states that
are in transition and also immature, are accompanied by erratic result on both the ‘democracy and 
good governance’ regarding their transformation, and that immature nature of the state in transition 
might results in affecting the quality of governance, which does not necessarily implies that, there is 
no relations between aid and democracy based on their statistical analysis.
In conclusion, as outlined in the reviewed it fundamentally shows wide range of perspectives on 
the conceptual appreciation of development assistance. Yet, why scholars in their attempt explained 
about the how and why questions of development assistance generally, still, conceptual and instructive 
perspectives on particularly the challenge of the management of development aid in certain recipient 
states needed further contribution to the existing scholarship. Particularly important is the aspect of 
policies that underlined domestic political parties, policies which eventually transformed into 
government in these states. Policy development or adoption at political party level is the outcome of 
political actors’ behavioral patterns. The behavioral pattern of political actors within mainstream 
political environment is guided by strategic actions, and in the less democratized states, such 
behavioral actions are always informed by instrumentalized motive manipulatively designed in pursuit 
of certain interests as long as there are no strong institutions that check their excesses. 
The overall agenda of this pattern can be informed by what Erving Goffman referred to as 
‘strategic interactions.’  In Sierra Leone, in the aftermath of the new political dispensation where 
antiquated political practices were to give way to the liberal democratic paradigm, political actors 
resulted into the practice of strategic political interactions using their political parties in adopting 
policies that were fundamentally instrumentalized, policies that could make them appeared as 
transformed yet, remains with practices of old political tricks, and it was within this pattern
development aid inflows accelerated conceived post-conflict development could be attained. Such 
policies of the parties were in dearth of a nationally planned approach, and were more of a calculated 
strategy by one party or other competing to maintain their hold and access to the state economic 
resource and power to control inflows of external support, whilst at the same operated politics of 
exclusion which thereby undermined the prospect for national development agenda to flourished. In 
the post-conflict development assistance challenge context of Sierra Leone, it is this strategic role of 
the political actors within which aid has become a monumental failure in the fifteen years of the liberal 
peacebuilding process. 
Political party policies or manifestos which are the foundation on which many governments have 
been constituted particularly governments in some of the less democratized, underdeveloped and 
multi-ethnic states, are largely not founded on fundamental transformative conception. Rather, these 
party policies when examined substantively, they largely appear pseudo in nature, and designed 
merely as an ideational strategy to secure political control of the state political opportunities. 
Particularly in multi-ethnic societies, competition for elections for instance, by the so-called political 
parties are not absolutely contested or founded on ideas, but are elections that are characterized by 
ethnic censusing, where identity becomes the Machiavellian instrument.
3. Sierra Leone post-conflict development assistance in context
As noted by Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout (1966), in the contemporary thinking of conceptual 
thoughts on development, concurrence have appeared among scholars that deteriorated ‘economic 
progress, poverty and underdevelopment of states can be enhanced through explorations and 
investments in areas such as human capital development, acceleration of state investment and savings, 
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technological investment, institutional reforms and employment output.’ These factors as outlined are 
conceived as some of the essential features characterizing many developed states, attained during 
years of evolutionary patterns, on which many in the developing South with recurrent decades of the 
state status quo, have been encouraged was the means towards social change and transformation, 
whether a country is transitioning from intra-state war to peace, or from a severely poor 
underdeveloped state yearning for growth and development. 
Emerged from one of the harst devasted civil wars in Africa, foreign aid was conceptualized 
within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding framework as characteristically paramount in the 
restoration of development across Sierra Leone. This was largely as a result of complex emergency 
context within which the country was transitioning. Besides, the Sub-Saharan Africa economic based 
have had history of negative sequential fiscal performance output, and as developing countries are 
further characterized by punctuated poverty scale that almost made the possibility for large scale 
economic savings a farfetched reality. This is noted in the work of Chenery and Strout (1966), who 
drew the nexus that within the chain of economic performance, it is through savings that investments 
in society become materialized and through investments, the economic based become viable which 
end result is growth in the economy of the state, a pattern they added, is absent in the developing 
countries on which therefore, development assistance could be viewed as integral for such societies to 
revamp their economic status (Chenery and Strout 1966) as response to the social problems. 
Periled by a failed state phenomenon and at the threshold of total collapse, bilateral development 
assistance, multilateral aid through international financial institutions, and assistance under the 
tutelage of the United Nations were Sierra Leone’s greatest post-conflict anticipated hope in thriving 
over the complex development challenge, such as poverty mitigation and socio-economic 
enhancement among the already despondent and despaired post-conflict growing population. 
International actors specifically the United Nations as a global effort, created an institutional 
framework titled: ‘Peacebuilding Commission’ in 2005 to assemble and superintend as one of its key 
roles, resources in the form of aid assistance for the acceleration of development in all post-conflict 
transitioning countries for the enhancement of a relative stability (Scott 2005). Particularly, Sierra 
Leone became one of the two maiden countries in which such framework was introduced in 2006, as a 
post-conflict peacebuilding development agenda for societal social change.  
Historically, theoretical analysis of social change in societies especially traditional states 
transitioning to modernity were supposed to follow a specific unidirectional pattern, a pattern which is 
particularly captured in evolutionary theory of social change, widely professed by scholars such as 
George Hegel, Auguste Comte, (Bardis 1959) and Talcott Persons etc., an approach which became the
core for modernization theorists. Evidence of this among others for instance, was on economic 
perspective taken by W.W. Rostow in his monograph titled: ‘Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto’ (1960). In similar context, reification of such unidirectional ideology was very 
much evident in the Post-Cold War Era, where post-conflict intervention in the effort to established 
social change and to attain development, external aid became a pattern in similar unidirectional 
approach to enhance social development and stability in the post-conflict societies.
Particularly in Sierra Leone, post-conflict development assistance did not only appear as 
exceptionally designed and in substantial amount, but was considered within the development cycle as 
the appropriate means for the attainment of stable development beyond the notion of mere state 
stability, as development was conceived could engender peace. Development assistance in this regard, 
targeted multisectoral factors ranging from direct support within the running of the governments 
through budget supports, and other financial supports within government for macro development 
programmes. For instance, with external budget supports from 2002 to 2014, the government received 
directly the sum of US$ 886 Million, wherein each year it approximately accounted for US$ 68 
million respectively (2016). Table one below indicates a summary tracking data from a few key 
development actors with direct development assistance to the budget support as mentioned: 
Table 1: Budget Supports Disbursement by Agency 2002-2014. (Million of USD 1)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
UK-DFID 16.7 16.5 18.3 26.9 34.6 26.7 18.2 18.4 19.7 23.9 18.9 20.8 24.7
European 
Union
- - 21.9 26.0 19.0 15.6 7.5 57.9 27.8 13.9 15.4 15.5 27.1
AfDB 31.4 0.2 14.1 9.7 23.3 - - 8.7 7.2 9.1 7.0 - 30.2
World 
Bank
13.6 16.2 16.9 18.2 - - 13.0 - - 2.4 23.6 6.4 50.5
Others - 0.1 - - - - - - 7.0 0.4 5.0 3.0 36.7
Total 61.7 33.1 71.1 80.8 76.9 42.3 38.7 85.0 61.6 49.7 70.0 45.6 169.2
Sources: Sierra Leone 2002-2015 Budget Support Evaluation Report. 
Moreover, beyond budget supports, development assistance consigned to Sierra Leone from 
bilateral and multilateral institutions also ranged from school feeding programmes to food security, 
energy, roads, water sector, poverty reduction, employment, governance, institutional supports both 
public and privates, as well as in the financial sector. Sierra Leone emerging from the civil war was 
not only dearth of functional and result oriented institutions and domestic income generation platform, 
but even access to common basic social amenities were incredibly not in existent. These dilemma
informed reasons as to why aid was conceived as remarkably important in the peacebuilding processes
towards the enhancement of fundamental social change, a framework that was ambiguously meant to 
uplift the country from existed permeated threats of underdevelopment and poverty to a relatively 
modern state structure. 
Excerpt of data collected during field research in Sierra Leone from the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Planning, under the section of Official Development Department in March 2019, is 
outline below from the following organizations that committed development assistance during the 
peacebuilding process in the country. 
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technological investment, institutional reforms and employment output.’ These factors as outlined are 
conceived as some of the essential features characterizing many developed states, attained during 
years of evolutionary patterns, on which many in the developing South with recurrent decades of the 
state status quo, have been encouraged was the means towards social change and transformation, 
whether a country is transitioning from intra-state war to peace, or from a severely poor 
underdeveloped state yearning for growth and development. 
Emerged from one of the harst devasted civil wars in Africa, foreign aid was conceptualized 
within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding framework as characteristically paramount in the 
restoration of development across Sierra Leone. This was largely as a result of complex emergency 
context within which the country was transitioning. Besides, the Sub-Saharan Africa economic based 
have had history of negative sequential fiscal performance output, and as developing countries are 
further characterized by punctuated poverty scale that almost made the possibility for large scale 
economic savings a farfetched reality. This is noted in the work of Chenery and Strout (1966), who 
drew the nexus that within the chain of economic performance, it is through savings that investments 
in society become materialized and through investments, the economic based become viable which 
end result is growth in the economy of the state, a pattern they added, is absent in the developing 
countries on which therefore, development assistance could be viewed as integral for such societies to 
revamp their economic status (Chenery and Strout 1966) as response to the social problems. 
Periled by a failed state phenomenon and at the threshold of total collapse, bilateral development 
assistance, multilateral aid through international financial institutions, and assistance under the 
tutelage of the United Nations were Sierra Leone’s greatest post-conflict anticipated hope in thriving 
over the complex development challenge, such as poverty mitigation and socio-economic 
enhancement among the already despondent and despaired post-conflict growing population. 
International actors specifically the United Nations as a global effort, created an institutional 
framework titled: ‘Peacebuilding Commission’ in 2005 to assemble and superintend as one of its key 
roles, resources in the form of aid assistance for the acceleration of development in all post-conflict 
transitioning countries for the enhancement of a relative stability (Scott 2005). Particularly, Sierra 
Leone became one of the two maiden countries in which such framework was introduced in 2006, as a 
post-conflict peacebuilding development agenda for societal social change.  
Historically, theoretical analysis of social change in societies especially traditional states 
transitioning to modernity were supposed to follow a specific unidirectional pattern, a pattern which is 
particularly captured in evolutionary theory of social change, widely professed by scholars such as 
George Hegel, Auguste Comte, (Bardis 1959) and Talcott Persons etc., an approach which became the
core for modernization theorists. Evidence of this among others for instance, was on economic 
perspective taken by W.W. Rostow in his monograph titled: ‘Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto’ (1960). In similar context, reification of such unidirectional ideology was very 
much evident in the Post-Cold War Era, where post-conflict intervention in the effort to established 
social change and to attain development, external aid became a pattern in similar unidirectional 
approach to enhance social development and stability in the post-conflict societies.
Particularly in Sierra Leone, post-conflict development assistance did not only appear as 
exceptionally designed and in substantial amount, but was considered within the development cycle as 
the appropriate means for the attainment of stable development beyond the notion of mere state 
stability, as development was conceived could engender peace. Development assistance in this regard, 
targeted multisectoral factors ranging from direct support within the running of the governments 
through budget supports, and other financial supports within government for macro development 
programmes. For instance, with external budget supports from 2002 to 2014, the government received 
directly the sum of US$ 886 Million, wherein each year it approximately accounted for US$ 68 
million respectively (2016). Table one below indicates a summary tracking data from a few key 
development actors with direct development assistance to the budget support as mentioned: 
Table 1: Budget Supports Disbursement by Agency 2002-2014. (Million of USD 1)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
UK-DFID 16.7 16.5 18.3 26.9 34.6 26.7 18.2 18.4 19.7 23.9 18.9 20.8 24.7
European 
Union
- - 21.9 26.0 19.0 15.6 7.5 57.9 27.8 13.9 15.4 15.5 27.1
AfDB 31.4 0.2 14.1 9.7 23.3 - - 8.7 7.2 9.1 7.0 - 30.2
World 
Bank
13.6 16.2 16.9 18.2 - - 13.0 - - 2.4 23.6 6.4 50.5
Others - 0.1 - - - - - - 7.0 0.4 5.0 3.0 36.7
Total 61.7 33.1 71.1 80.8 76.9 42.3 38.7 85.0 61.6 49.7 70.0 45.6 169.2
Sources: Sierra Leone 2002-2015 Budget Support Evaluation Report. 
Moreover, beyond budget supports, development assistance consigned to Sierra Leone from 
bilateral and multilateral institutions also ranged from school feeding programmes to food security, 
energy, roads, water sector, poverty reduction, employment, governance, institutional supports both 
public and privates, as well as in the financial sector. Sierra Leone emerging from the civil war was 
not only dearth of functional and result oriented institutions and domestic income generation platform, 
but even access to common basic social amenities were incredibly not in existent. These dilemma
informed reasons as to why aid was conceived as remarkably important in the peacebuilding processes
towards the enhancement of fundamental social change, a framework that was ambiguously meant to 
uplift the country from existed permeated threats of underdevelopment and poverty to a relatively 
modern state structure. 
Excerpt of data collected during field research in Sierra Leone from the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Planning, under the section of Official Development Department in March 2019, is 
outline below from the following organizations that committed development assistance during the 
peacebuilding process in the country. 
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3.1. World Bank development aid  
World Bank was and has been one of the main multilateral institutions through which much of the 
development assistance to Sierra Leone generated. The institution undertook varied support 
interventions. From excerpt of the data collected, between 2009 and 2017, on four thematic areas 
substantial resources were consigned as development assistance by World Bank for the post-conflict 
development of the country. For instance, on institutional reform and capacity building from 2009 to 
2012, it committed in aid US$ 17,479,623. Also, on youth employment support, the institution 
committed from 2010 to 2015 the sum of US$ 20,832,032, and similarly for energy sector on access 
alone from 2015 to 2017, it committed US$ 12,292,949. On agribusiness development support for 
2016 and 2017, the institution also devoted US$ 8,676,891 respectively, etc. 
3.2. United Nations Development Programme  
As one of the main institutions for post-conflict development in the developing countries, the United 
Nations development programmes in the post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone supported 
governance on multifaceted areas and a few of these are outline as follows:  On public sector reform 
and capacity building from 2009 to 2014, it dedicated US$ 3,909,780, whilst on support to access and 
justice from 2009 to 2016, the sum of US$ 5,063,329 was committed. The United Nations 
Development Programme also provided development assistance for youth employment and 
empowerment for seven years from 2011 to 2017 that totaled US$ 7,098,333, whilst on local 
government and economic empowerment within the six years period from 2012 to 2017, 
US$ 3,080,275, and in 2015 it supported the national constitutional review process with US$ 252,114 
and security sector reform US$ 1,622,885 etc. 
3.3. Department for International Development (DFID)  
DFID is the United Kingdom overseas development assistance institution, and in Sierra Leone, is the 
leading bilateral development assistance organ towards the post-conflict peacebuilding process since 
1999. Among a range of thematic support areas, DFID provided aid for Sierra Leone Poverty 
Reduction for 2009 that totaled US$ 19,221,642 and in 2010 US$ 15,810,277 was committed. On civil 
service reform programme in the same year it provided US$ 852,288 and US$ 245,193 were 
committed whilst on the same context for public sector reform programme, DFID provided in 2009, 
US$ 142,205 and in 2010, US$ 594,717 respectively. In rural electrification project, it is stated that for 
both 2016 to 2017, the total amount of US$ 19,135,910 were committed by DFID as aid. 
3.4. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and International Fund for 
Agricultural development (FAO and IFAD)  
On agriculture, through Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on a project 
termed ‘Smallholders commercialization-global agricultural on Food and security’ for five years 
period from 2011 to 2016, a committed sum of US$ 13,853,233 was provided as development 
assistance, at the same time International Fund for Agricultural Development from 2009 to 2017, 
committed to the rehabilitation and community-based poverty reduction project as aid the amount of 
US$ 41,355,391. 
3.5. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
Peacebuilding fund provided wide range of aid to key thematic areas. One of such was to the energy 
sector which in 2009, provided US$ 5,040,813, and Japan with aid towards the same sector in 2010 
provided US$ 469,134. Also, European Union on support of decentralization committed 
US$ 8,557,659 etc.
3.6. International Monetary Fund  
International Monetary Fund also contributed to the post-conflict development support through 
financing, for instance the sum of US$ 164 million was approved as development assistance project in 
2001 for Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Facility for a three-year period from 2001 to 2004, by 2002, 
a total of US$ 59 million was committed (IMF Press Release 2002. para.2). Also, in 2013, through 
IMF extended credit facility for Sierra Leone, approved US$ 95.9 million on a three-year period on 
which US$ 13.7 million was disbursed for the start-up phase (IMF Press Release 2013.para.1) etc. 
Furthermore, beyond these summarized excerpts on some aid donors to Sierra Leone, other extensive 
bilateral aid supports were provided by the United States of America, China, Germany etc., and other 
institutions such as the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank etc. These 
were key development assistance actors to Sierra Leone post-conflict peacebuilding, which were 
conceived such assistance could lead towards fundamental socio-economic and political social change 
and development in the country. But, as aforementioned, the political pattern within which key of their 
policies focused were more centered on a politically strategic interactions and policy 
instrumentalization than on national development, completely resulted in creating an ambience of a 
deep-rooted challenge of the management of the aid that were provided for meaningful impacts.
4. Instrumentalization of post-conflict political party governance’s policy framework
On ending the war in 2002, it was practically obvious that the sustainability of political parties in the 
emerging post-war governance system was dependent on what policy framework operated by 
respective political parties. This emergence political direction viewed as a somewhat deviation from 
the previously deep rooted pattern of political behavioral practices, resulted into political parties 
identifying strategic pattern through which their parties can remain relevant and be factored within the 
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3.1. World Bank development aid  
World Bank was and has been one of the main multilateral institutions through which much of the 
development assistance to Sierra Leone generated. The institution undertook varied support 
interventions. From excerpt of the data collected, between 2009 and 2017, on four thematic areas 
substantial resources were consigned as development assistance by World Bank for the post-conflict 
development of the country. For instance, on institutional reform and capacity building from 2009 to 
2012, it committed in aid US$ 17,479,623. Also, on youth employment support, the institution 
committed from 2010 to 2015 the sum of US$ 20,832,032, and similarly for energy sector on access 
alone from 2015 to 2017, it committed US$ 12,292,949. On agribusiness development support for 
2016 and 2017, the institution also devoted US$ 8,676,891 respectively, etc. 
3.2. United Nations Development Programme  
As one of the main institutions for post-conflict development in the developing countries, the United 
Nations development programmes in the post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone supported 
governance on multifaceted areas and a few of these are outline as follows:  On public sector reform 
and capacity building from 2009 to 2014, it dedicated US$ 3,909,780, whilst on support to access and 
justice from 2009 to 2016, the sum of US$ 5,063,329 was committed. The United Nations 
Development Programme also provided development assistance for youth employment and 
empowerment for seven years from 2011 to 2017 that totaled US$ 7,098,333, whilst on local 
government and economic empowerment within the six years period from 2012 to 2017, 
US$ 3,080,275, and in 2015 it supported the national constitutional review process with US$ 252,114 
and security sector reform US$ 1,622,885 etc. 
3.3. Department for International Development (DFID)  
DFID is the United Kingdom overseas development assistance institution, and in Sierra Leone, is the 
leading bilateral development assistance organ towards the post-conflict peacebuilding process since 
1999. Among a range of thematic support areas, DFID provided aid for Sierra Leone Poverty 
Reduction for 2009 that totaled US$ 19,221,642 and in 2010 US$ 15,810,277 was committed. On civil 
service reform programme in the same year it provided US$ 852,288 and US$ 245,193 were 
committed whilst on the same context for public sector reform programme, DFID provided in 2009, 
US$ 142,205 and in 2010, US$ 594,717 respectively. In rural electrification project, it is stated that for 
both 2016 to 2017, the total amount of US$ 19,135,910 were committed by DFID as aid. 
3.4. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and International Fund for 
Agricultural development (FAO and IFAD)  
On agriculture, through Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on a project 
termed ‘Smallholders commercialization-global agricultural on Food and security’ for five years 
period from 2011 to 2016, a committed sum of US$ 13,853,233 was provided as development 
assistance, at the same time International Fund for Agricultural Development from 2009 to 2017, 
committed to the rehabilitation and community-based poverty reduction project as aid the amount of 
US$ 41,355,391. 
3.5. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
Peacebuilding fund provided wide range of aid to key thematic areas. One of such was to the energy 
sector which in 2009, provided US$ 5,040,813, and Japan with aid towards the same sector in 2010 
provided US$ 469,134. Also, European Union on support of decentralization committed 
US$ 8,557,659 etc.
3.6. International Monetary Fund  
International Monetary Fund also contributed to the post-conflict development support through 
financing, for instance the sum of US$ 164 million was approved as development assistance project in 
2001 for Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Facility for a three-year period from 2001 to 2004, by 2002, 
a total of US$ 59 million was committed (IMF Press Release 2002. para.2). Also, in 2013, through 
IMF extended credit facility for Sierra Leone, approved US$ 95.9 million on a three-year period on 
which US$ 13.7 million was disbursed for the start-up phase (IMF Press Release 2013.para.1) etc. 
Furthermore, beyond these summarized excerpts on some aid donors to Sierra Leone, other extensive 
bilateral aid supports were provided by the United States of America, China, Germany etc., and other 
institutions such as the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank etc. These 
were key development assistance actors to Sierra Leone post-conflict peacebuilding, which were 
conceived such assistance could lead towards fundamental socio-economic and political social change 
and development in the country. But, as aforementioned, the political pattern within which key of their 
policies focused were more centered on a politically strategic interactions and policy 
instrumentalization than on national development, completely resulted in creating an ambience of a 
deep-rooted challenge of the management of the aid that were provided for meaningful impacts.
4. Instrumentalization of post-conflict political party governance’s policy framework
On ending the war in 2002, it was practically obvious that the sustainability of political parties in the 
emerging post-war governance system was dependent on what policy framework operated by 
respective political parties. This emergence political direction viewed as a somewhat deviation from 
the previously deep rooted pattern of political behavioral practices, resulted into political parties 
identifying strategic pattern through which their parties can remain relevant and be factored within the 
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mainstream political superstructure, particularly with the advent of the international actors who were 
considered as not only moral guarantors for the peace process, but as robust financiers to the state for 
peace consolidation process as the only viable means of economic generation by the state.
Of the two political parties that administered the state during the period considered of its post-
conflict peacebuilding from 2002 to 2018, were the SLPP and APC, that became confronted with this 
phenomenon in which within the process resulted into instrumentalization of policy adoption at 
political party level, policies which eventually metamorphosed into governance framework that 
became conceived as an agenda in pursuing socio-economic political post-conflict development for 
social change, but policies which merely lacked cohesive national development context. This pattern 
challenges the management of the development aid impact at a broad national transformative level of 
Sierra Leone since 2002. The two subsections below present desk review on two of the political 
parties especially the patterns of their superficial policy codifications to suits the apparent political 
climate, policies which largely assumed were predicated on national development strategies between 
2000 and 2018.
4.1. Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), 2007-2007
The first post-conflict political party to govern Sierra Leone was the SLPP. Taken over the realm of 
governance in 1996, during the epoch of the war and under its political administration international 
supports and devoted cooperation from the rebels, resulted into creating an environment of stability 
and peace in 2002. In the post-war elections of 2002, the SLPP party was given the second term 
mandate of five years to govern the country and its political party manifestos metamorphosed into the 
first national working document of government for peacebuilding and development. The party policy 
or manifestos professed wide-range of policy outlines that served as the working tool for the 
governance between 2002 and 2007 in its second term of office. Excerpt of these policies as heralded
by the SLPP party was to particularly addressed issues such as: ‘(a) democracy and good governance 
considered the bedrock for the attainment of economic and political development; (b) massive 
agricultural investment that could ensure food security; (c) economic prudency and fiscal management 
to improve on the quality of lives; (d) poverty reduction; (e) youth empowerment through trainings 
and employments; (f) reformation within the judiciary to rendered it credible, effective and efficient;  
(g) pursue zero corruption and; (h) economic and institutional decentralization (Presidential Inaugural 
Speech at Parliament, 2002)’1 etc. This party policies were what became the government directives 
and as seen from the faced valued, international actor’s advocacy are always largely concentrated on 
some of these terminologies particularly in the quest for stability recuperation in post-conflict societies, 
and in Sierra Lone on account of this, it attracted massive concentration of aid support. 
                                                     
1 Inaugural Address by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 2002, Parliament Building, Tower Hill, Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-071202.html / Accessed on 15 November 2019>. 
These policies were under the canopy of what the regime called the ‘New Coalition for National 
Development’, yet were more of an ideationally crafted political democratic jargons which substance 
appeared much less attainable as the political parties were starkly bifurcated on differentiated policy 
orientation as a country which therefore undermined the development of a nationally developed 
framework from that initial post-conflict context. Yet politics of divisiveness became triumphed, and 
common ground for consensus building waned. Additionally, the SLPP while the internal political 
party policy that became governance tool were not informed by inclusivity, it embarked on poverty 
reduction approach through the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, a document that 
outlined the approaches needed for transitioning the country from war to post-war development, and 
on which development assistance were hugely committed. The adopted PRSP sectoral policy reflected 
in three thematic focused areas, which included ‘(1) Promoting good governance, security and peace; 
(2) Promotion of pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation; and (3) Promoting 
human development’ (Shinoda 2012). These policies as outline though fundamental for state 
development and particularly for conflict country in transition to peace. However, in the context of 
Sierra Leone, the pattern of politics that came to be infused by elite captured, these policies ended up 
as a mere political tool typical of manipulation whilst issues of poverty, underdevelopment and youth 
employment as macroeconomic pillars for transformation remained profoundly unaddressed for 
majority of the citizens, especially at the time the Sierra Leone received tremendous financial 
assistance as aid support.  At the end of the five-year regime in 2007, food security was a failure, state 
institution became politicized, and Sierra Leone was still least on the United Nations Human 
Development Index.   
4.2. All People’s Congress (APC), 2007-2018
Completing ten years of governance under one political party, where five years were during the reign 
of the warfare, and the other five years during the aftermath of the war, political governance was taken 
over by the All People’s Congress following the defeat of the SLPP in the second post-conflict general 
elections held in 2007. The 2007 general election was particularly crucial in light of the extent of the 
eminent political fragility and the weak state institutions that were still eminent. Perhaps the positive 
outcome of this pattern of electoral democracy is the recurrent change of political actors within the 
same political cycle and yet profound development outcome for social change remained unfounded. 
In the political manifestos of the APC regime that came to be known as ‘An Agenda for Change,’
varied policy guidelines were also advocated which eventually became the policy framework on which 
the state was governed in its first term from 2007 to 2012. Excerpt on three of the thematic policy 
areas professed were as follows: (a) Economy, that the party shall signifies judicious economic 
management, design large scale economic opportunities, eliminate barriers to trade, emboldened 
strong micro economic policies, and ensures that the normal living standard of the population is 
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mainstream political superstructure, particularly with the advent of the international actors who were 
considered as not only moral guarantors for the peace process, but as robust financiers to the state for 
peace consolidation process as the only viable means of economic generation by the state.
Of the two political parties that administered the state during the period considered of its post-
conflict peacebuilding from 2002 to 2018, were the SLPP and APC, that became confronted with this 
phenomenon in which within the process resulted into instrumentalization of policy adoption at 
political party level, policies which eventually metamorphosed into governance framework that 
became conceived as an agenda in pursuing socio-economic political post-conflict development for 
social change, but policies which merely lacked cohesive national development context. This pattern 
challenges the management of the development aid impact at a broad national transformative level of 
Sierra Leone since 2002. The two subsections below present desk review on two of the political 
parties especially the patterns of their superficial policy codifications to suits the apparent political 
climate, policies which largely assumed were predicated on national development strategies between 
2000 and 2018.
4.1. Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), 2007-2007
The first post-conflict political party to govern Sierra Leone was the SLPP. Taken over the realm of 
governance in 1996, during the epoch of the war and under its political administration international 
supports and devoted cooperation from the rebels, resulted into creating an environment of stability 
and peace in 2002. In the post-war elections of 2002, the SLPP party was given the second term 
mandate of five years to govern the country and its political party manifestos metamorphosed into the 
first national working document of government for peacebuilding and development. The party policy 
or manifestos professed wide-range of policy outlines that served as the working tool for the 
governance between 2002 and 2007 in its second term of office. Excerpt of these policies as heralded
by the SLPP party was to particularly addressed issues such as: ‘(a) democracy and good governance 
considered the bedrock for the attainment of economic and political development; (b) massive 
agricultural investment that could ensure food security; (c) economic prudency and fiscal management 
to improve on the quality of lives; (d) poverty reduction; (e) youth empowerment through trainings 
and employments; (f) reformation within the judiciary to rendered it credible, effective and efficient;  
(g) pursue zero corruption and; (h) economic and institutional decentralization (Presidential Inaugural 
Speech at Parliament, 2002)’1 etc. This party policies were what became the government directives 
and as seen from the faced valued, international actor’s advocacy are always largely concentrated on 
some of these terminologies particularly in the quest for stability recuperation in post-conflict societies, 
and in Sierra Lone on account of this, it attracted massive concentration of aid support. 
                                                     
1 Inaugural Address by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 2002, Parliament Building, Tower Hill, Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-071202.html / Accessed on 15 November 2019>. 
These policies were under the canopy of what the regime called the ‘New Coalition for National 
Development’, yet were more of an ideationally crafted political democratic jargons which substance 
appeared much less attainable as the political parties were starkly bifurcated on differentiated policy 
orientation as a country which therefore undermined the development of a nationally developed 
framework from that initial post-conflict context. Yet politics of divisiveness became triumphed, and 
common ground for consensus building waned. Additionally, the SLPP while the internal political 
party policy that became governance tool were not informed by inclusivity, it embarked on poverty 
reduction approach through the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, a document that 
outlined the approaches needed for transitioning the country from war to post-war development, and 
on which development assistance were hugely committed. The adopted PRSP sectoral policy reflected 
in three thematic focused areas, which included ‘(1) Promoting good governance, security and peace; 
(2) Promotion of pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation; and (3) Promoting 
human development’ (Shinoda 2012). These policies as outline though fundamental for state 
development and particularly for conflict country in transition to peace. However, in the context of 
Sierra Leone, the pattern of politics that came to be infused by elite captured, these policies ended up 
as a mere political tool typical of manipulation whilst issues of poverty, underdevelopment and youth 
employment as macroeconomic pillars for transformation remained profoundly unaddressed for 
majority of the citizens, especially at the time the Sierra Leone received tremendous financial 
assistance as aid support.  At the end of the five-year regime in 2007, food security was a failure, state 
institution became politicized, and Sierra Leone was still least on the United Nations Human 
Development Index.   
4.2. All People’s Congress (APC), 2007-2018
Completing ten years of governance under one political party, where five years were during the reign 
of the warfare, and the other five years during the aftermath of the war, political governance was taken 
over by the All People’s Congress following the defeat of the SLPP in the second post-conflict general 
elections held in 2007. The 2007 general election was particularly crucial in light of the extent of the 
eminent political fragility and the weak state institutions that were still eminent. Perhaps the positive 
outcome of this pattern of electoral democracy is the recurrent change of political actors within the 
same political cycle and yet profound development outcome for social change remained unfounded. 
In the political manifestos of the APC regime that came to be known as ‘An Agenda for Change,’
varied policy guidelines were also advocated which eventually became the policy framework on which 
the state was governed in its first term from 2007 to 2012. Excerpt on three of the thematic policy 
areas professed were as follows: (a) Economy, that the party shall signifies judicious economic 
management, design large scale economic opportunities, eliminate barriers to trade, emboldened 
strong micro economic policies, and ensures that the normal living standard of the population is 
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improved; on (b) Agriculture, that the party shall rejuvenates the agricultural sector to become the 
anchor for financial growth and decrease poverty, transform Sierra Leone  into food self-security, and 
to ensure the sector becomes the fulcrum for job creation and; on (c) Decentralization, that the party 
will embark on the devolution of ‘political, legislature, administrative and economic’ pillars with 
capacitation of local governments as means to moderate the exponential rural poverty2 etc.  
Additionally, whilst in the first term of APC the political manifestos that was professed ‘An 
Agenda for Change’ viewed simplistically as the PRSP II did not culminate into substantive social 
change across communities in the country amidst the external support as stated in the table, the party 
invented another political manifesto and named it ‘An Agenda for Prosperity,’ on which it was re-
elected for another second term of five years where such policies were immediately metamorphosed 
into government policy framework. In sierra Leone electoral victory are not determined by smart 
political ideas that could be appropriately seen would lead to modicum social changes in society 
because of the overt cleavage structure, therefore, the pattern of instrumentalization of policies by
political parties has become a well-established and founded pattern. The APC political party ‘2012 to 
2018 agenda for prosperity’ governance manifesto was metaphorically an assumption that conceived 
that changed had been established in Sierra Leone during the era of the agenda for change period 
initially professed as policy.  However, the actual reality was, it was merely a political framing
strategically designed to manipulate the voting electorates especially given the taken for granted 
pattern of ethnic and regional attachment, and the level of poverty the electorates were exposed, which 
presuppose that the combination of these factors emboldened the permeation of elites’ manipulative 
strategies within the political space.
The Agenda for Prosperity policies of the APC outlined many pillars, an excerpt on a few of them 
includes: (a) Economy, which the party stressed on broadening the economic sector at both micro and 
macro level for economic stabilization, management of reduced expenditure over revenue, and  
transforming the sector to serve as a source for job creation; (b) On energy and power, the party 
professed that all cities and major communities would access functional electrification to enhance 
local economic promotion; (c) On jobs for youths, that the party would dedicate the entire five-year 
term on improving the status of youths and enhancing their employments opportunities and; (d) On 
agricultural sector, the party manifesto emphatically proclaimed reducing the pattern of subsistence 
farming system with an immense scale of mechanize agriculture to increase national food production 
that ensures food security (Presidential Inaugural Speech at Parliament  2012)3 etc. 
It is interesting to note that, within these proclaimed political policies on which it constituted 
mainly the roadmap through which post-conflict peacebuilding and development were supposed to be 
                                                     
2 Sierra Herald publication 2009. ’All People’s Congress Manifesto 2007 Elections‘  
.<http://www.sierraherald.com/apc-manifesto-2007.htm, 9 (1). /Accessed on 16 November 2019>.
3 Inaugural Address by President Ernest Bai Koroma, 2012. Parliament Building, Freetown.  
<http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/koroma-121412.html / Accessed on 15 November 2019> 
attained, were largely over ridden by severe elite capture by both political parties, that made used of 
inherent peacebuilding opportunities to further personal agenda, whilst fundamental national 
development agenda that were not built on cohesiveness for sustained growth and development in the 
fifteen years of governance, a pattern characteristic of a broader ethnoregional-neopatrimonial 
political salience. In essence these policies were merely to serve as conduit to access power and the 
related opportunities by the political class as oppose to fundamentally any realistic agenda for post-
conflict peacebuilding and development.
5. Pattern of strategic interactions in the post-conflict politics and challenge of aid management 
in Sierra Leone
Even before the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, a clear pathway on the pattern of how politics 
was going to be shaped had already been established. From historical accounts, the political class that 
captured the post-independence mainstream political system since 1961, did not pursue transformative 
approach in the agricultural and mining sector- the two most viable productive sectors of the country 
through which a sustainable national economic power of the state could have been established and 
stabilize. What resulted instead was elite manipulation of the sector along with an established 
patronage structure that produced less dividend to the state. The sector became unattractive to 
government for capital investment that could enhance national development as huge capital intensive 
was required for such engagement for which within the political cycle, beyond personal interest, were 
not prepared and willing to undertake long term development strategy for these two sectors, which led 
to the abandonment of the mining and agricultural sector completely. 
Thus, with the overt abandonment of these sectors, politics become envisioned as the only major 
means through which post-independence transformation of the state could be realized. Nevertheless, 
even along this path the availability of the political space was constricted and was considered only for 
a few privilege class, and with limited openings through patronage or socio-political and cultural 
lineage from village and at national level. Throughout the 1960s and onto early 1990s, it was this 
pattern that shrouded and characterized the political space to the extent that it became deeply rooted 
and highly traditionalized. 
During the post-conflict period, political transformation was absolutely imperative and such 
transformation was inherent within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process that led to 
fundamental openness within the political space. With the advent of exogenous pressure and the 
endogenous advocacies posed by domestic civil society groups for transformation within the political 
cycle, the environment of politics was rendered a battlefield where struggle for survival within the 
political system became the means to an end as democratic practice emerged as the conduit in 
transitioning the country from its deep-rooted traditionalize pattern of politics to one that emphasized 
tolerance, competition, transparency and accountability in political space, and the subjugation of 
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improved; on (b) Agriculture, that the party shall rejuvenates the agricultural sector to become the 
anchor for financial growth and decrease poverty, transform Sierra Leone  into food self-security, and 
to ensure the sector becomes the fulcrum for job creation and; on (c) Decentralization, that the party 
will embark on the devolution of ‘political, legislature, administrative and economic’ pillars with 
capacitation of local governments as means to moderate the exponential rural poverty2 etc.  
Additionally, whilst in the first term of APC the political manifestos that was professed ‘An 
Agenda for Change’ viewed simplistically as the PRSP II did not culminate into substantive social 
change across communities in the country amidst the external support as stated in the table, the party 
invented another political manifesto and named it ‘An Agenda for Prosperity,’ on which it was re-
elected for another second term of five years where such policies were immediately metamorphosed 
into government policy framework. In sierra Leone electoral victory are not determined by smart 
political ideas that could be appropriately seen would lead to modicum social changes in society 
because of the overt cleavage structure, therefore, the pattern of instrumentalization of policies by
political parties has become a well-established and founded pattern. The APC political party ‘2012 to 
2018 agenda for prosperity’ governance manifesto was metaphorically an assumption that conceived 
that changed had been established in Sierra Leone during the era of the agenda for change period 
initially professed as policy.  However, the actual reality was, it was merely a political framing
strategically designed to manipulate the voting electorates especially given the taken for granted 
pattern of ethnic and regional attachment, and the level of poverty the electorates were exposed, which 
presuppose that the combination of these factors emboldened the permeation of elites’ manipulative 
strategies within the political space.
The Agenda for Prosperity policies of the APC outlined many pillars, an excerpt on a few of them 
includes: (a) Economy, which the party stressed on broadening the economic sector at both micro and 
macro level for economic stabilization, management of reduced expenditure over revenue, and  
transforming the sector to serve as a source for job creation; (b) On energy and power, the party 
professed that all cities and major communities would access functional electrification to enhance 
local economic promotion; (c) On jobs for youths, that the party would dedicate the entire five-year 
term on improving the status of youths and enhancing their employments opportunities and; (d) On 
agricultural sector, the party manifesto emphatically proclaimed reducing the pattern of subsistence 
farming system with an immense scale of mechanize agriculture to increase national food production 
that ensures food security (Presidential Inaugural Speech at Parliament  2012)3 etc. 
It is interesting to note that, within these proclaimed political policies on which it constituted 
mainly the roadmap through which post-conflict peacebuilding and development were supposed to be 
                                                     
2 Sierra Herald publication 2009. ’All People’s Congress Manifesto 2007 Elections‘  
.<http://www.sierraherald.com/apc-manifesto-2007.htm, 9 (1). /Accessed on 16 November 2019>.
3 Inaugural Address by President Ernest Bai Koroma, 2012. Parliament Building, Freetown.  
<http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/koroma-121412.html / Accessed on 15 November 2019> 
attained, were largely over ridden by severe elite capture by both political parties, that made used of 
inherent peacebuilding opportunities to further personal agenda, whilst fundamental national 
development agenda that were not built on cohesiveness for sustained growth and development in the 
fifteen years of governance, a pattern characteristic of a broader ethnoregional-neopatrimonial 
political salience. In essence these policies were merely to serve as conduit to access power and the 
related opportunities by the political class as oppose to fundamentally any realistic agenda for post-
conflict peacebuilding and development.
5. Pattern of strategic interactions in the post-conflict politics and challenge of aid management 
in Sierra Leone
Even before the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, a clear pathway on the pattern of how politics 
was going to be shaped had already been established. From historical accounts, the political class that 
captured the post-independence mainstream political system since 1961, did not pursue transformative 
approach in the agricultural and mining sector- the two most viable productive sectors of the country 
through which a sustainable national economic power of the state could have been established and 
stabilize. What resulted instead was elite manipulation of the sector along with an established 
patronage structure that produced less dividend to the state. The sector became unattractive to 
government for capital investment that could enhance national development as huge capital intensive 
was required for such engagement for which within the political cycle, beyond personal interest, were 
not prepared and willing to undertake long term development strategy for these two sectors, which led 
to the abandonment of the mining and agricultural sector completely. 
Thus, with the overt abandonment of these sectors, politics become envisioned as the only major 
means through which post-independence transformation of the state could be realized. Nevertheless, 
even along this path the availability of the political space was constricted and was considered only for 
a few privilege class, and with limited openings through patronage or socio-political and cultural 
lineage from village and at national level. Throughout the 1960s and onto early 1990s, it was this 
pattern that shrouded and characterized the political space to the extent that it became deeply rooted 
and highly traditionalized. 
During the post-conflict period, political transformation was absolutely imperative and such 
transformation was inherent within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process that led to 
fundamental openness within the political space. With the advent of exogenous pressure and the 
endogenous advocacies posed by domestic civil society groups for transformation within the political 
cycle, the environment of politics was rendered a battlefield where struggle for survival within the 
political system became the means to an end as democratic practice emerged as the conduit in 
transitioning the country from its deep-rooted traditionalize pattern of politics to one that emphasized 
tolerance, competition, transparency and accountability in political space, and the subjugation of 
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parties and actors to public decision making. Thus, in its transition to democracy, existed fragile 
institutions resulted into creating a political opportunity patterns in which structured political agenda 
did not cohesively emerge, yet politics of cleavage structural contestation became triumphed and its 
practice evolved over time into becoming the political culture that defines the overall political 
superstructure of Sierra Leone.  
Informed by this pattern of strategic interaction of political parties, resulted into policy 
formulation where post-conflict cohesive national development framework was not only compromised 
but undermined, as political party resulted in pursuing social cleavage interest than on building solid 
post-conflict national development agenda. It was within this pattern that the evidence of a deeply-
rooted threat to the general societal development and social change became complex. Consequently, 
informed by this pattern of political interactions, one typical phenomenon that became glaring was the 
instrumentalization of governance policies that can appeal to international actors within which 
resources can be committed, a pattern that became a taken for granted disposition adopted by the 
political parties in their policy formulation and profession.  
This reflected in the strategic interactive pattern of political parties resulting into policy framing 
merely in the interest of meeting entrance requirement into the political space, whilst at the same time 
viewed opponents as uncharacteristic of modern political practice in their political calculation and this 
was merely to control wider political environment. For instance, in one of the speeches in 2002, from 
one of the political parties, the SLPP, the leadership opined that:
‘We must not allow the electorates to be hoodwink by those who erroneously believe 
that they can walk and talk their way to parliament or state house through a patchwork 
of recycled ideas…The principle of democracy recognizes the rights of anyone or any 
group of persons who meet the appropriate constitutional requirements to contest 
elections for public office. However, we should let the electorates be forewarned that 
there are many out there who see the electoral process as an open and free-for- all 
picnic…. National elections are a serious business based on public trust and public 
responsibility. They should not be taken for granted, especially by those who are 
sincerely committed to be servants of the people…’ (Speech by President Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah 2002)4.
The idealistic policies adopted by these political parties were what became metamorphosed into 
mainstream governance system on which post-conflict development and peacebuilding was 
                                                     
4 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, ‘Speech on his re-election as leader of the SLPP and his nomination as the SLPP 
Candidate for the 2002 Presidential Election.’  
<http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-031602.html /  Accessed on 17 November 2019> 
concentrated, and conceived, such policies would lead to fundamental transformation of social change 
at the societal level. As a multiethnic country and as society where constructed identities appear to 
have become the main determinant of political system evident in the nature of ethnoregional-
neopatrimonial pattern, whatever policies become adopted by parties are largely supported by cleavage 
identities sometimes without deeper conceptualization, a pattern that also prevented these two political 
parties from seeking national policy agenda as there were already established constituencies where 
support based could always be invariably harnessed. For instance, given the nature of the political 
manipulative pattern that became a structurally taken for granted style in the mainstream political 
system, in 2012, the political manifesto on ‘An Agenda for Change’ under the realm of one of the 
political parties, the APC, was re-elected in 2012 under a new political policy/manifesto of ‘Agenda 
for Prosperity,’ even though the agenda for change political policies were merely a sham as any 
formidable transformative development were not realized within the period comparative to the huge 
aid poured and the local income generated within the time frame concurrently.
This characterization provided profound space on which political party manifestos or policies that 
were translated into mainstream politics lacks national development framework. These policies were 
symbolism of what the state of nature was, and can be conceptualized as manipulation of post-conflict 
development opportunities by the political class through the nature and pattern of the strategic 
interactive politics infused in the mainstream governance. Also, one fundamental means through 
which the dearth of national development framework of these party policies was recognized was 
through the recurrent discontinuity of succeeding political party policies of previous regime by another. 
It became recurrent that immediately one political party term of office ends, all the established policies 
of that regime automatically come to a halt whilst the new regime completely begin with a new policy 
agenda relatively unconnected to the previous regime. And what has accounted for this largely is 
because of the absence of a synergized national development framework adopted by the state
Additionally, such trend implies that within each regime development has to be started from 
afresh instead of followed in similar trend of previous development agenda of succeeding regime. 
Political parties consciously embarked on this pattern as strategic interaction because it was a common 
thought within the political cycle that by merely following previous regime’s policy agenda it is 
believed could make their political parties lost firm grip within the political space, and especially in 
Sierra Leone where political parties do not have established and identifiable political party ideology, 
but merely an instrumentalized kind of political agenda mainly for gaining votes. In such pattern 
national development becomes a secondary concern for state actors.  While political party policy 
discontinuity between one political regime and another could be an obvious pattern of developed 
democracies and workable in developed societies, yet in developing countries that are largely 
dependent on development aid for their political transition, such as Sierra Leone, such pattern of 
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parties and actors to public decision making. Thus, in its transition to democracy, existed fragile 
institutions resulted into creating a political opportunity patterns in which structured political agenda 
did not cohesively emerge, yet politics of cleavage structural contestation became triumphed and its 
practice evolved over time into becoming the political culture that defines the overall political 
superstructure of Sierra Leone.  
Informed by this pattern of strategic interaction of political parties, resulted into policy 
formulation where post-conflict cohesive national development framework was not only compromised 
but undermined, as political party resulted in pursuing social cleavage interest than on building solid 
post-conflict national development agenda. It was within this pattern that the evidence of a deeply-
rooted threat to the general societal development and social change became complex. Consequently, 
informed by this pattern of political interactions, one typical phenomenon that became glaring was the 
instrumentalization of governance policies that can appeal to international actors within which 
resources can be committed, a pattern that became a taken for granted disposition adopted by the 
political parties in their policy formulation and profession.  
This reflected in the strategic interactive pattern of political parties resulting into policy framing 
merely in the interest of meeting entrance requirement into the political space, whilst at the same time 
viewed opponents as uncharacteristic of modern political practice in their political calculation and this 
was merely to control wider political environment. For instance, in one of the speeches in 2002, from 
one of the political parties, the SLPP, the leadership opined that:
‘We must not allow the electorates to be hoodwink by those who erroneously believe 
that they can walk and talk their way to parliament or state house through a patchwork 
of recycled ideas…The principle of democracy recognizes the rights of anyone or any 
group of persons who meet the appropriate constitutional requirements to contest 
elections for public office. However, we should let the electorates be forewarned that 
there are many out there who see the electoral process as an open and free-for- all 
picnic…. National elections are a serious business based on public trust and public 
responsibility. They should not be taken for granted, especially by those who are 
sincerely committed to be servants of the people…’ (Speech by President Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah 2002)4.
The idealistic policies adopted by these political parties were what became metamorphosed into 
mainstream governance system on which post-conflict development and peacebuilding was 
                                                     
4 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, ‘Speech on his re-election as leader of the SLPP and his nomination as the SLPP 
Candidate for the 2002 Presidential Election.’  
<http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-031602.html /  Accessed on 17 November 2019> 
concentrated, and conceived, such policies would lead to fundamental transformation of social change 
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Additionally, such trend implies that within each regime development has to be started from 
afresh instead of followed in similar trend of previous development agenda of succeeding regime. 
Political parties consciously embarked on this pattern as strategic interaction because it was a common 
thought within the political cycle that by merely following previous regime’s policy agenda it is 
believed could make their political parties lost firm grip within the political space, and especially in 
Sierra Leone where political parties do not have established and identifiable political party ideology, 
but merely an instrumentalized kind of political agenda mainly for gaining votes. In such pattern 
national development becomes a secondary concern for state actors.  While political party policy 
discontinuity between one political regime and another could be an obvious pattern of developed 
democracies and workable in developed societies, yet in developing countries that are largely 
dependent on development aid for their political transition, such as Sierra Leone, such pattern of 
disjointed policy approach can produce development stagnation and can posed strong challenge to 
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social change in such societies. This pattern in the post-conflict trend is fundamentally the causal 
factor through which the challenge of the management of development aid in Sierra Leone can be 
conceptualized. 
6. Sierra Leone and the current state of post-conflict challenge 
Sierra Leone from 2002 to 2018, a period described as the prime time of its post-conflict 
peacebuilding process, experienced a heyday of a huge influx of development assistance both through 
bilateral and multilateral means. It was categorical that the survival of Sierra Leone as a nation-state 
was almost nonexistent, its domestic sovereignty was battered, and was only resuscitated by the 
intervention of the international community. As indicated in the above stated patterns, whilst 
approaches were designed to accelerate Sierra Leone beyond a state failure status, political practices 
by internal actors evident through the display of elite captured within the same period further rendered 
the country into total stagnation. Such practice scuttled the development assistance impact, and Sierra 
Leone currently presents a typical archetype of a development aid failure. This phenomenon has been 
captured in several published reports describing the major variables of change in the country as 
extremely at a poor performing status 
For instance, in the published report by Statistics Sierra Leone titled: ‘Sierra Leone Integrated 
Household Survey Report for 2018,’ extensively elaborated on the profound trend of the country’s 
poverty level as been on a severely systematic increase (Statistic Sierra Report 2019). The report 
stated that the current poverty status of Sierra Leone is 56.8 percent for the year 2018, and further 
recognized that in the rural area alone, poverty level has remained so widespread with a current trend 
at 73.9% (Ibid). Whilst poverty has systematically remained on the increase, food insecurity in the 
country has also been widespread. According to World Food Programme Sierra Leone, food insecurity 
in 2015 was at the level of 49.8 percent, in 2018 it was 43.7 percent, whilst in 2019 it increased to 53.4 
percent respectively.5 Beyond the food insecurity and poverty conditions across the country, problem 
of unemployment has also been on a fundamental increase. Unemployment in this context implies 
people who are keenly seeking job as part of the working force to improve their livelihood but simply 
could not identify with any. According to the research work done by Molla Mekonnen Alemu (2016), 
it stated that the country has about ‘60 percent of its population structurally unemployed.’ This level of 
high unemployment rate is also recognized in the United Nations Development Programme data on 
Sierra Leone. In fact, even for those working, it is stated that, four out of five are working under poor 
condition below US$ 3.1 per day.6
                                                     
5 Presentation made in Sierra Leone by World Food Programme Sierra Leone Country Office on the activities of 
the organization’s role, food poverty profile and planned strategies towards its reduction / 25 November 2019. 
6 Danish Trade Union Council for International Development Report 2017. Labour Market Profile of Sierra 
Leone.<http://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/sites/default/files/uploads/public/PDF/LMP/lmp_sierra_leone_201
7_final.pdf/ Accessed on 26 November 2019> 
Additionally, Sierra Leone is still considered as one of those countries with limited scale of 
electricity energy consumption by its population. Electricity consumption is relatively and erratically 
visible in a few urban centers, but these are merely intermittent, whilst vast majority of the rural 
communities have never experienced any form of electrification. Naturally, energy generated through 
electricity and its consumption rate is considered as significantly important to accelerate both small 
and big industrial growth within societies which empowers the internal economic growth, this reality 
in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone has been a farfetched reality. Moreover, for consecutive
years Sierra Leone has been ranked at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index 
reports. For instance, for the period of 2017, the country was ranked 184 out of 189 and has been of a
similar pattern for all the years that preceded it.  Sierra Leone within the same period has been 
characterized as one of the lowest income countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This is evident 
in the United Nations Development Programme on Statistical update for 2015, 2016 and 2017, using 
the GNI per capital which stagnated at US$ 1,297; 1,216; and 1,240 respectively7. As mentioned in 
previous sections, all of these trends occur at the same time when huge development assistance were 
seen expended in the country expected could have resulted into tremendous transformation of the 
country and ultimately result into fundamental social change. 
As reported on the tremendous inflow of development aid in Sierra Leone, the country has 
remained one of the poorest in the world, and some of the created structural reality of this outcome as 
highlighted in this section are fundamentally not unconnected to the nature and pattern of the domestic 
politics and governance type that has been patterned to become a culture and practice.
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has vividly argued on a mechanism through which the challenge of development aid in 
most recipient countries can be conceptualized, using Sierra Leone as a typical archetype. 
Development assistance challenge in ongoing scholarly literature have maximally concentrated on the 
complexity of the aid structural pattern and interest, as viewpoints through which the failure of aid 
must be traced. In this essay, the central argument is that, in carefully appreciating domestic political 
party policies or manifestos of the aid recipient countries, policies which eventually metamorphosed 
into the formation of what appear as government policies of the country where development assistance 
has been largely concentrated conceived transformation could be archived, provides instructive and
compelling conceptual viewpoint to the context of why aid management remains a challenge in some
societies.
An internally engendered political parties that championed the post-conflict development 
                                                     
7 United Nations Development Programme 2018. Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical 
Update. Briefing Note for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf / Accessed on 27 
November 2019>
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percent respectively.5 Beyond the food insecurity and poverty conditions across the country, problem 
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it stated that the country has about ‘60 percent of its population structurally unemployed.’ This level of 
high unemployment rate is also recognized in the United Nations Development Programme data on 
Sierra Leone. In fact, even for those working, it is stated that, four out of five are working under poor 
condition below US$ 3.1 per day.6
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Additionally, Sierra Leone is still considered as one of those countries with limited scale of 
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visible in a few urban centers, but these are merely intermittent, whilst vast majority of the rural 
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and big industrial growth within societies which empowers the internal economic growth, this reality 
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years Sierra Leone has been ranked at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index 
reports. For instance, for the period of 2017, the country was ranked 184 out of 189 and has been of a
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in the United Nations Development Programme on Statistical update for 2015, 2016 and 2017, using 
the GNI per capital which stagnated at US$ 1,297; 1,216; and 1,240 respectively7. As mentioned in 
previous sections, all of these trends occur at the same time when huge development assistance were 
seen expended in the country expected could have resulted into tremendous transformation of the 
country and ultimately result into fundamental social change. 
As reported on the tremendous inflow of development aid in Sierra Leone, the country has 
remained one of the poorest in the world, and some of the created structural reality of this outcome as 
highlighted in this section are fundamentally not unconnected to the nature and pattern of the domestic 
politics and governance type that has been patterned to become a culture and practice.
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has vividly argued on a mechanism through which the challenge of development aid in 
most recipient countries can be conceptualized, using Sierra Leone as a typical archetype. 
Development assistance challenge in ongoing scholarly literature have maximally concentrated on the 
complexity of the aid structural pattern and interest, as viewpoints through which the failure of aid 
must be traced. In this essay, the central argument is that, in carefully appreciating domestic political 
party policies or manifestos of the aid recipient countries, policies which eventually metamorphosed 
into the formation of what appear as government policies of the country where development assistance 
has been largely concentrated conceived transformation could be archived, provides instructive and
compelling conceptual viewpoint to the context of why aid management remains a challenge in some
societies.
An internally engendered political parties that championed the post-conflict development 
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approach in Sierra Leone did not fundamentally create national development agenda. Instead, cleavage 
and incohesive development policies that fundamentally have no correlation to transformation was 
what informed Sierra Leone post-conflict development pattern from 2002 to 2018, hence, the 
challenge of the management of development aid. These are socially created structural barriers that 
have become a taken for granted pattern of Sierra Leone, and it is an outcome imbedded in the current 
ethnoregional-neopatrimonial style of governance system in the country. This entire context implied 
that, the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding occasioned in Sierra Leone its consolidation is in a deep 
dilemma, threatened by emerge endogenous factors which has made its success untenable. Future 
research along this pattern must therefore, systematically examine how strategic interactive political 
practices in the less democratized societies fundamentally undermine state institutions. 
Acknowledgment
The work is indebted to the African Studies Center – Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, for the 
great assistance in undertaking this field research. My esteemed gratifications to the entire staff of the 
center.
References
Addison, T., G. Mavrotas, and M. Mark 2005. ‘Aid to Africa: An unfinished agenda’. Journal of
International Development 17: 989-1001.
Alemu, M.M. 2016. ‘The role of institutional arrangements for youth employment and empowerment 
in Sierra Leone’. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ipc/opager/318.html / Accessed on 10 November 
2019>. 
Alesina, A. and D. David 2000. ‘Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?’ Journal of Economic
Growth 5(1): 33-63. 
Askarov, Z. and H. Doucouliagos 2015. ‘Aid and institutions in transition economies’. European 
Journal of Political Economy 38: 55-70.  
Ball, R. and J. Christopher 1996. ‘Political, economic and humanitarian motivations for PL 480 food 
aid: Evidence from Africa’. Economic Development and Cultural Change 44: 515-537. 
Bardis, P.D. 1959. ‘Theories of social change’. The Indian Journal of Political Science 20(4): 283-290.  
Barney, J. and T. Felin 2013. ‘What are microfoundations?’ The Academy of Management 
Perspectives 27(2).138-155. 
Boschini, A. and A. Olofsgard 2007. ‘Foreign aid: An instrument of fighting communism?’ The 
Journal of Development Studies 43(4): 622-648. 
Brautigam, D.A. and K. Steven 2004. ‘Foreign Aid, institutions in Sub Sahara Africa’. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 52(2): 255-285. 
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar 2000. ‘Aid, policies and growth’. The American Economic Review 90 (4): 
847-868. 
Caffentzis, G. 2002. ‘Neoliberalism in Africa, apocalypse failures and business as usual practices’.
Turkish Journal of International Studies 1(3). 80-104. 
Chenery, H.B. and A.M. Strout 1996. ‘Foreign assistance and economic development’. The American 
Economic Review 56(4): 679-733. 
Chen, S. and R. Martin 2012. ‘More relatively-poor people in less absolutely-poor world’. In Policy
Research Working Paper, WPS 6114, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler 2002. ‘Aid, policy and peace: Reducing the risks of civil conflict’. Defense 
and Peace Economies 13(6): 435-450. 
—— 2007. ‘Civil War’. In Handbook of Defense Economics Volume 2: Defense in a Globalized 
World. Eds.  K. Hartley and T. Sander, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp.731-736. 
Collier, P., V.L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis 2003. ‘Breaking 
the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy’. A World Bank Policy Research Report 
26121. 
Collier, P. and D. Dollar 2001. ‘Aid allocation and poverty reduction’. European Economic Review
46: 1475-1500. 
Collier, P. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done
About It. New York: Oxford University Press.
Crawford, G. 1997. ‘Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency’.
Democratization 4(3): 69-108. 
—— 1998. ‘Human rights and democracy in EU development cooperation: Towards fair and equal 
treatment’. In European Union and Development Policy. Ed. M. Lister, London: Macmillan Press,
pp.131-175. 
Dann, P. 2013. The Law of Development Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, 
the EU and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DeLong, J.B. and B. Eichengreen 1991. ‘The Marshall Plan: History’s most successful structural
adjustment program’. NBER Working Paper 3899. 
Francis, D.J. 2001. The Politics of Economics Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS. London: 
Routledge. 
Gisselguist, R.M. 2018. ‘Good aid in hard places: Learning from “successful” intervention in fragile 
situations’. In Development Assistance for Peacebuilding. Ed. R.M. Gisselquist, Abingdon: 
Routledge, pp.1-19. 
Goffman, E. 1969. Strategic Interaction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Goldsmith, A.A. 2001. ‘Foreign aid and statehood in Africa’. International Organization 55(1): 123-
Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states
― 50 ―
approach in Sierra Leone did not fundamentally create national development agenda. Instead, cleavage 
and incohesive development policies that fundamentally have no correlation to transformation was 
what informed Sierra Leone post-conflict development pattern from 2002 to 2018, hence, the 
challenge of the management of development aid. These are socially created structural barriers that 
have become a taken for granted pattern of Sierra Leone, and it is an outcome imbedded in the current 
ethnoregional-neopatrimonial style of governance system in the country. This entire context implied 
that, the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding occasioned in Sierra Leone its consolidation is in a deep 
dilemma, threatened by emerge endogenous factors which has made its success untenable. Future 
research along this pattern must therefore, systematically examine how strategic interactive political 
practices in the less democratized societies fundamentally undermine state institutions. 
Acknowledgment
The work is indebted to the African Studies Center – Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, for the 
great assistance in undertaking this field research. My esteemed gratifications to the entire staff of the 
center.
References
Addison, T., G. Mavrotas, and M. Mark 2005. ‘Aid to Africa: An unfinished agenda’. Journal of
International Development 17: 989-1001.
Alemu, M.M. 2016. ‘The role of institutional arrangements for youth employment and empowerment 
in Sierra Leone’. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ipc/opager/318.html / Accessed on 10 November 
2019>. 
Alesina, A. and D. David 2000. ‘Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?’ Journal of Economic
Growth 5(1): 33-63. 
Askarov, Z. and H. Doucouliagos 2015. ‘Aid and institutions in transition economies’. European 
Journal of Political Economy 38: 55-70.  
Ball, R. and J. Christopher 1996. ‘Political, economic and humanitarian motivations for PL 480 food 
aid: Evidence from Africa’. Economic Development and Cultural Change 44: 515-537. 
Bardis, P.D. 1959. ‘Theories of social change’. The Indian Journal of Political Science 20(4): 283-290.  
Barney, J. and T. Felin 2013. ‘What are microfoundations?’ The Academy of Management 
Perspectives 27(2).138-155. 
Boschini, A. and A. Olofsgard 2007. ‘Foreign aid: An instrument of fighting communism?’ The 
Journal of Development Studies 43(4): 622-648. 
Brautigam, D.A. and K. Steven 2004. ‘Foreign Aid, institutions in Sub Sahara Africa’. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 52(2): 255-285. 
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar 2000. ‘Aid, policies and growth’. The American Economic Review 90 (4): 
847-868. 
Caffentzis, G. 2002. ‘Neoliberalism in Africa, apocalypse failures and business as usual practices’.
Turkish Journal of International Studies 1(3). 80-104. 
Chenery, H.B. and A.M. Strout 1996. ‘Foreign assistance and economic development’. The American 
Economic Review 56(4): 679-733. 
Chen, S. and R. Martin 2012. ‘More relatively-poor people in less absolutely-poor world’. In Policy
Research Working Paper, WPS 6114, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler 2002. ‘Aid, policy and peace: Reducing the risks of civil conflict’. Defense 
and Peace Economies 13(6): 435-450. 
—— 2007. ‘Civil War’. In Handbook of Defense Economics Volume 2: Defense in a Globalized 
World. Eds.  K. Hartley and T. Sander, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp.731-736. 
Collier, P., V.L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis 2003. ‘Breaking 
the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy’. A World Bank Policy Research Report 
26121. 
Collier, P. and D. Dollar 2001. ‘Aid allocation and poverty reduction’. European Economic Review
46: 1475-1500. 
Collier, P. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done
About It. New York: Oxford University Press.
Crawford, G. 1997. ‘Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency’.
Democratization 4(3): 69-108. 
—— 1998. ‘Human rights and democracy in EU development cooperation: Towards fair and equal 
treatment’. In European Union and Development Policy. Ed. M. Lister, London: Macmillan Press,
pp.131-175. 
Dann, P. 2013. The Law of Development Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, 
the EU and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DeLong, J.B. and B. Eichengreen 1991. ‘The Marshall Plan: History’s most successful structural
adjustment program’. NBER Working Paper 3899. 
Francis, D.J. 2001. The Politics of Economics Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS. London: 
Routledge. 
Gisselguist, R.M. 2018. ‘Good aid in hard places: Learning from “successful” intervention in fragile 
situations’. In Development Assistance for Peacebuilding. Ed. R.M. Gisselquist, Abingdon: 
Routledge, pp.1-19. 
Goffman, E. 1969. Strategic Interaction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Goldsmith, A.A. 2001. ‘Foreign aid and statehood in Africa’. International Organization 55(1): 123-
Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon
― 51 ―
148. 
Griffin, K.B. and J.L. Enos 1970. ‘Foreign assistance: Objective and consequences’. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 18(3): 313-327. 
Hagmann, T. and F. Reyntjens 2016. ‘Introduction: Aid and authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa
after 1990’. In Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa. Eds. T. Hagmann and F. Reyntjens, London:
Zeb Books. 
Hall, P.A. and R.C.R. Taylor 1998. ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism’. In
Institutions and Social Order. Eds. K. Scottan, E.M. Uslaner, and V. Haufler, Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, pp.15-40. 
Harris, D. 2014. Sierra Leone: A Political History. London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2002. ‘IMF completes review under Sierra Leone’s PRGF 
arrangement and approves US$ 12 million disbursement’. News Brief 2/19.
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/29/18/03/nb0219 / Accessed on 12 November
2019> 
—— 2010. Application of Structural Conditionality – 2009 Annual Report. Washington, DC: IMF. 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/030910.pdf / Accessed on 29 September 2019> 
—— 2013. ‘IMF executive board approves three-year, US$ 95.9 million ECF arrangement for Sierra 
Leone’. Press Release 13/410.
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr13410 / Accessed on 12 November 
2019> 
Jalloh, M. 2013. ‘Natural resources endowment and economic growth: The West Africa experiences’. 
Journal of Natural Resources and Development 3: 66-84. 
John, R.G, M. Kandeh, A. Jalloh, G.C. Nelson, and T.S. Thomas 2013. ‘Sierra Leone’. In West 
African Agriculture and Climate Change. A Comprehensive Analysis. Eds. A. Jalloh, G.C. Nelson,
T.S. Thomas, R. Zougmore, and H. Roy-Macauley, Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, pp.323-350. 
Jones, S. and F. Tarp 2016. ‘Does foreign aid harm political institutions?’ Journal of Developmen
Economics 118: 266-281. 
Kallon, E.V.N 2020. ‘Ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism and its challenge to liberal post-conflict 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone’. Working Paper.
Kaplan, J.J. 1950. ‘United States foreign aid programs: Past perspectives and future needs’. World
Politics 3(1): 55-71.
Knack, S. 2004. ‘Does foreign aid promote democracy?’ International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 251-
266. 
Lancaster, C. 1999. ‘Aid effectiveness in Africa: The unfinished agenda’. Journal of African 
Economies 8(4): 487-503. 
Maizels, A. and M.K. Nissanke 1984. Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries’. World 
Development 12(9): 879-900. 
Manning, C. 2016. ‘Assessing African political party systems after the third wave’. In African Politics
Volume IV. Ed. N. Cheeseman, Abingdon: Routledge, pp.101-119. 
McKinlay, R.D. and R. Little 1978. ‘A foreign-policy model of the distribution of British bilateral aid, 
1960-1970’. British Journal of Political Science 8(3): 313-331. 
Moyo, D. 2009. ‘Why foreign aid is hurting Africa’. The Wall Street Journal 21 March 2009. 
—— 2016. OECD Factbook 2015-2016: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Paris:
OECD Publishing. 
Olaniyan, R.O. 1996. Foreign Aid, Self-Reliance and Economic Development in West Africa.
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
Omoruyi, E.M.M., S. Zhibin, G. Jun, S.Y. Sidi, and Y. Pianran 2016. ‘Foreign aid and economic 
growth: Does it plays any significant role in Sub-Sahara Africa’. International Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 23: 129-140. 
Park, J.D. 2019. Re-Investing Africa’s Development: Linking Africa to the Korean Development
Model. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Picard, L.A. and Z.A. Karasia 2015. ‘The Truman administration’s foreign aid legacy: From the Cold 
War to the war on terrorism’. In Foreign Aid and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman. Ed. R.H. 
Geselbracht, Missouri: Truman State University Press, pp.11-24. 
Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse, and H. Miall 2011. Contemporary Conflict Resolution Third Edition.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Roberts, G.O. 1975. ‘The role of foreign aid in independent Sierra Leone’. Journal of Black Studies
5(4): 339-373 
Rostow, W.W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Schraeder, P.J., S.W. Hook, and B. Taylor 1998. ‘Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of 
American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows’. World Politics 50(2): 294-323. 
Scott, A. 2012. ‘The United Nations peacebuilding commission early assessment’. Journal of 
Peacebuilding and Development 4(2): 2-19. 
Shinoda, H. 2012. ‘The Sierra Leone model of peacebuilding? The principle of local security’s 
ownership and liberal democracy in Africa’. IPSHU (Institute of Peace Science, Hiroshima 
University) English Research Report Series 27: 2-22. 
<https://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/heiwa/Pub/E27/e27shinoda.pdf / Accessed on 24 October 2019> 
Soltan, K. 1999. ‘Institutions as Products of Politics’. In Institutions and Social Order. Eds. K. Soltan, 
E. M. Uslander, and V. Haufler, Ann Arbor: The Michigan University Press, pp.60. 
Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states
― 52 ―
148. 
Griffin, K.B. and J.L. Enos 1970. ‘Foreign assistance: Objective and consequences’. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 18(3): 313-327. 
Hagmann, T. and F. Reyntjens 2016. ‘Introduction: Aid and authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa
after 1990’. In Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa. Eds. T. Hagmann and F. Reyntjens, London:
Zeb Books. 
Hall, P.A. and R.C.R. Taylor 1998. ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism’. In
Institutions and Social Order. Eds. K. Scottan, E.M. Uslaner, and V. Haufler, Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, pp.15-40. 
Harris, D. 2014. Sierra Leone: A Political History. London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2002. ‘IMF completes review under Sierra Leone’s PRGF 
arrangement and approves US$ 12 million disbursement’. News Brief 2/19.
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/29/18/03/nb0219 / Accessed on 12 November
2019> 
—— 2010. Application of Structural Conditionality – 2009 Annual Report. Washington, DC: IMF. 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/030910.pdf / Accessed on 29 September 2019> 
—— 2013. ‘IMF executive board approves three-year, US$ 95.9 million ECF arrangement for Sierra 
Leone’. Press Release 13/410.
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr13410 / Accessed on 12 November 
2019> 
Jalloh, M. 2013. ‘Natural resources endowment and economic growth: The West Africa experiences’. 
Journal of Natural Resources and Development 3: 66-84. 
John, R.G, M. Kandeh, A. Jalloh, G.C. Nelson, and T.S. Thomas 2013. ‘Sierra Leone’. In West 
African Agriculture and Climate Change. A Comprehensive Analysis. Eds. A. Jalloh, G.C. Nelson,
T.S. Thomas, R. Zougmore, and H. Roy-Macauley, Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, pp.323-350. 
Jones, S. and F. Tarp 2016. ‘Does foreign aid harm political institutions?’ Journal of Developmen
Economics 118: 266-281. 
Kallon, E.V.N 2020. ‘Ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism and its challenge to liberal post-conflict 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone’. Working Paper.
Kaplan, J.J. 1950. ‘United States foreign aid programs: Past perspectives and future needs’. World
Politics 3(1): 55-71.
Knack, S. 2004. ‘Does foreign aid promote democracy?’ International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 251-
266. 
Lancaster, C. 1999. ‘Aid effectiveness in Africa: The unfinished agenda’. Journal of African 
Economies 8(4): 487-503. 
Maizels, A. and M.K. Nissanke 1984. Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries’. World 
Development 12(9): 879-900. 
Manning, C. 2016. ‘Assessing African political party systems after the third wave’. In African Politics
Volume IV. Ed. N. Cheeseman, Abingdon: Routledge, pp.101-119. 
McKinlay, R.D. and R. Little 1978. ‘A foreign-policy model of the distribution of British bilateral aid, 
1960-1970’. British Journal of Political Science 8(3): 313-331. 
Moyo, D. 2009. ‘Why foreign aid is hurting Africa’. The Wall Street Journal 21 March 2009. 
—— 2016. OECD Factbook 2015-2016: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Paris:
OECD Publishing. 
Olaniyan, R.O. 1996. Foreign Aid, Self-Reliance and Economic Development in West Africa.
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
Omoruyi, E.M.M., S. Zhibin, G. Jun, S.Y. Sidi, and Y. Pianran 2016. ‘Foreign aid and economic 
growth: Does it plays any significant role in Sub-Sahara Africa’. International Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 23: 129-140. 
Park, J.D. 2019. Re-Investing Africa’s Development: Linking Africa to the Korean Development
Model. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Picard, L.A. and Z.A. Karasia 2015. ‘The Truman administration’s foreign aid legacy: From the Cold 
War to the war on terrorism’. In Foreign Aid and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman. Ed. R.H. 
Geselbracht, Missouri: Truman State University Press, pp.11-24. 
Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse, and H. Miall 2011. Contemporary Conflict Resolution Third Edition.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Roberts, G.O. 1975. ‘The role of foreign aid in independent Sierra Leone’. Journal of Black Studies
5(4): 339-373 
Rostow, W.W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Schraeder, P.J., S.W. Hook, and B. Taylor 1998. ‘Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of 
American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows’. World Politics 50(2): 294-323. 
Scott, A. 2012. ‘The United Nations peacebuilding commission early assessment’. Journal of 
Peacebuilding and Development 4(2): 2-19. 
Shinoda, H. 2012. ‘The Sierra Leone model of peacebuilding? The principle of local security’s 
ownership and liberal democracy in Africa’. IPSHU (Institute of Peace Science, Hiroshima 
University) English Research Report Series 27: 2-22. 
<https://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/heiwa/Pub/E27/e27shinoda.pdf / Accessed on 24 October 2019> 
Soltan, K. 1999. ‘Institutions as Products of Politics’. In Institutions and Social Order. Eds. K. Soltan, 
E. M. Uslander, and V. Haufler, Ann Arbor: The Michigan University Press, pp.60. 
Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon
― 53 ―
Statistics Sierra Leone Report 2019. ‘Sierra Leone integrated household survey report 2018’. 
<https://www.statistics.sl/images/StatisticsSL/Documents/SLIHS2018/SLIHS_2018_New/sierra_
leone_integrated_household_survey2018_report.pdf / Accessed on 28 November 2019> 
Tait, L., A. Siddique, and I. Chatterjee 2015. ‘Foreign aid and economic growth in Sub-Sahara Africa’. 
<https://ecompapers.biz.uwa.edu.au/paper/PDF%20of%20Discussion%20Papers/2015/DP%2015.
35_Siddique1.pdf / Accessed on 24 September 2019> 
Tarnoff, C. 2009. ‘Millennium challenge cooperation’. CRS Report for Congress 7-5700. 
United Nations 2005. Yearbook of the United Nations 2005. New York: United Nations. 
United Nations Development Programme 2019. ‘Sierra Leone multidimensional poverty index 2019’. 
Freetown. 
<https://ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sierra_Leone_MPI_2019_final.pdf / Accessed on 25 
November 2019> 
Wennmann, A. 2009. ‘Conflict economies’. In Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon. Ed. V. Chetail,
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.74-88. 
Wiafe-Amoako, F. 2017. Africa: The World Today Series, 2017-2018 52nd Edition. Lanharm:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Woods, N. 2005. ‘The shifting politics of foreign aid’. International Affairs, Royal Institute of Internal 
Affairs 81(2): 393-409. 
Zeiler, T.W. 2015. ‘Genesis of foreign aid revolution’. In Foreign Aid and the Legacy of Harry
Truman. Ed. R.H. Geselbracht, Missouri: Truman States University Press, pp.33-41. 
Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states
― 54 ―
